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INTRODUCTION
The year 2012 proved to be one for the history books: not as the
year of the Mayan apocalypse, but as the hottest year on record in the
United States.' Globally, it was the tenth warmest year since recordkeeping began in 1880.2 North Carolina experienced its sixth-highest
* @ 2013 Caroline Cress.
1. 2012 was the warmest year in the contiguous United States since record-keeping
began in 1895. NAT'L CLIMATIC DATA CTR., NAT'L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN.,
STATE OF THE CLIMATE: NATIONAL OVERVIEW - ANNUAL 2012 (Jan. 8, 2013),

http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/sotc/national/2012/13. The average temperature was 3.2oF
higher than the twentieth century average, a full degree above the previous record set in
1998. Id.; see also Justin Gillis, Not Even Close: 2012 Was Hottest Ever in U.S., N.Y. TIMES
(Jan. 8, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/09/science/earth/2012-was-hottest-yearever-in-us.html?_r=2& ("The temperature differences between years are usually
measured in fractions of a degree, but last year's 55.3 degree average demolished the
previous record, set in 1998, by a full degree Fahrenheit.").
2. NAT'L CLIMATIC DATA CTR., NAT'L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., STATE

OF THE CLIMATE: GLOBAL ANALYSIS - ANNUAL 2012 (Dec. 2013), http://www.ncdc.noaa

.gov/sotc/global/2012/13 ("The annually-averaged temperature across global land and
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average annual temperature ever, with top-five records set in cities
across the state.' Overall, three hundred fifty-five "all-time" record
high temperatures were either tied or broken across the country.4 But
it was not just the heat that made headlines. More Arctic sea ice
melted in 2012 than ever before,' and the unprecedented thawing of
ninety-seven percent of the Greenland ice sheet shocked even NASA
scientists.6 American corn and soybean crops suffered from massive
droughts across more than sixty percent of the country, and
"Superstorm" Sandy devastated the mid-Atlantic and northeastern
United States, causing nearly fourteen feet of storm surge in New
York City Harbor.' Climate disasters have continued to strike in 2013:
ocean surfaces was 0.57 0 C (1.03oF) above the 20th century average .... Including 2012, all
12 years to date in the 21st century (2001-2012) rank among the 14 warmest in the 133year period of record.").
3. 2012 was the sixth warmest recorded year in North Carolina history, with an
annual average temperature 1.70 F higher than the twentieth century average. NAT'L
CLIMATIC DATA CTR., NAT'L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., STATE OF THE
CLIMATE: NATIONAL OVERVIEW - ANNUAL 2012, WARMEST SEASONS AND CALENDAR
YEARS ON RECORD, http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/sotc/national/2012/13/supplemental/page-3
(last visited Nov. 15, 2013). Raleigh experienced its fourth warmest year on record;
Charlotte its fifth; Asheville its first; Greensboro its third; and Cape Hatteras its fourth.
NAT'L CLIMATIC DATA CTR., NAT'L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., STATE OF THE
CLIMATE: NATIONAL OVERVIEW - ANNUAL 2012, YEAR-TO-DATE TEMPERATURE
ANOMALIES, http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/sotc/national/2012/13/supplemental (last visited
Nov. 15, 2013).
4. NAT'L CLIMATIC DATA CTR., NAT'L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., STATE
OF THE CLIMATE: NATIONAL OVERVIEW - ANNUAL 2012, KNOWN ALL-TIME
TEMPERATURE RECORDS TIED OR BROKEN, http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/sotc/national
/2012/13/supplemental/page-6 (last visited Nov. 15, 2013).
5. NAT'L CLIMATIC DATA CTR., NAT'L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., STATE
OF THE CLIMATE: GLOBAL SNOW & ICE - ANNUAL 2012 (Jan. 15, 2013),
http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/sotc/global-snow/2012/13; see Justin Grieser, Top 5 International
Weather Events of 2012, WASH. POST (Dec. 31, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com
/blogs/capital-weather-gang/post/top-5-international-weather-events-of-

2012/2012/12/31/971dcl72-5362-11e2-8b9e-dd8773594efc

blog.html.

6. See Press Release, Maria-Jos6 Vifias, Earth Sci. News Team, Nat'l Aeronautics &
Space Admin., Satellites See Unprecedented Greenland Ice Sheet Surface Melt (July 24,
2012), http://www.nasa.gov/topics/earth/features/greenland-melt.html.
7. See NAT'L CLIMATIC DATA CTR., NAT'L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN.,
STATE OF THE CLIMATE: NATIONAL OVERVIEW - ANNUAL 2012, 2012 NATIONAL TOP
EVENTS,
http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/sotc/national/2012/13
10
WEATHERICLIMATE
[hereinafter
TOP
10
(last
visited
Nov.
15, 2013)
/supplemental/page-10
WEATHER/CLIMATE EVENTS]; Gillis, supra note 1.
8. See TOP 10 WEATHER/CLIMATE EVENTS, supra note 7; Gillis, supra note 1. While
no individual climatic event can be tied directly to global warming, most scientists agree
that these disasters are a mere sampling of what the future holds if global greenhouse gas
emissions continue to go unchecked. See, e.g., NAT'L CLIMATE ASSESSMENT & DEV.
ADVISORY COMM., THIRD NATIONAL CLIMATE ASSESSMENT (NCA) REPORT 1091 (Jan.
14, 2013),
available at http://ncadac.globalchange.gov/download/NCAJan11-2013publicreviewdraft-fulldraft.pdf ("While there is always a chance that particular extreme
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In November, "Super Typhoon" Haiyan struck the Philippines with
sustained winds of 195 miles per hour, making it "the strongest
tropical cyclone on record to make landfall in world history."9
Naming storms with superlatives like this may soon become more the
norm than the exception, with hundred-year climate events like
floods and wildfires now occurring over three times their predicted
frequency.o The time for debating whether the climate is changing is
long over." The difficult question that society now must confront is

events may have occurred naturally, from a statistical perspective, the likelihood of some
of these events has clearly increased due to climate change."); id. at 1103 ("Climate
change is already leading to more intense rainfall events and more extreme weather
patterns. The changes in worldwide weather patterns will lead to more droughts in some
areas and more floods in others, as well as more frequent heat waves over many land
areas. The risk associated with wildfires in the western U.S. is increasing, and coastal
inundation is becoming a common occurrence in low-lying areas.").
9. Jeff Masters, Super Typhoon Haiyan Finishes Pounding the Philippines, Headed
for Vietnam, DR. JEFF MASTERS' WUNDERBLOG, WEATHER UNDERGROUND (Nov. 8,
2013, 3:50 PM), http://www.wunderground.com/blog/JeffMasters/comment.html?entrynum
=2574. The storm had wind gusts up to 235 miles per hour and remained a Category 5
storm for two days. See id.
10. See Paul B. Farrell, Warning: 100-year Climate Disasters Every 100 Days,
MARKETWATCH, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 25, 2013, 12:02 AM), http://www.marketwatch.com
/story/warning-100-year-climate-disasters-every-100-days-2013-09-25;
see
also Bill
Chappell, Arizona Wildfire Kills 19 Firefighters,Deadliestin Decades, NAT'L PUB. RADIO
(July 1, 2013, 7:22 AM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwo-way/2013/07/01/197556858
larizona-wildfire-kills-19-firefighters-deadliest-in-decades (describing "the deadliest U.S.
wildfire in at least 30 years"); Adam Gabbatt, Colorado Flood Deaths Reach Eight But
Number of Missing Continues to Fall, THE GUARDIAN (Sept. 17, 2013, 1:19 PM),
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/17/colorado-flood-deaths-missing (describing
massive flooding in Colorado that "destroyed or damaged around 19,000 homes" and
displace "nearly 12,000 people").
11. See NAT'L CLIMATE ASSESSMENT & DEV. ADVISORY COMM., supra note 8, at

1080 ("Given the fact that science is built on the premise of criticism rather than
consensus, the widespread agreement in the scientific community regarding the reality of
climate change and the leading role of human activities in driving this change is nothing
short of remarkable. More than 97% of scientists in this field agree that the world is
unequivocally warming and that human activity is the primary cause of the warming
experienced over the past 50 years."); see also Humans are Primary Cause of Global
Ocean Warming Over Past 50 Years, Research Shows, SCIENCE DAILY (June 11, 2012),
http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2012/06/120611153234.htm ("The bottom line is that
this study substantially strengthens the conclusion that most of the observed global ocean
warming over the past 50 years is attributable to human activities."). Even Dr. Richard
Muller, a former climate skeptic funded by the conservative Koch Foundation, publicly
announced this year that his own studies confirm the theory of manmade climate change.
See Richard A. Muller, Op-Ed., The Conversion of a Climate-Change Skeptic, N.Y. TIMES
(July 28, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/30/opinion/the-conversion-of-a-climatechange-skeptic.html?pagewanted=all ("Last year, following an intensive research effort
involving a dozen scientists, I concluded that global warming was real and that the prior
estimates of the rate of warming were correct. I'm now going a step further: Humans are
almost entirely the cause."). .
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what to do about it. 12 It is no secret that the United States has failed
to address this challenge seriously,13 but the reasons for this failure
are numerous and complex. Among them are (1) the lack of concrete,
identifiable harm to mobilize public opinion and legislative action;14
(2) the influence of special interest lobbies promoting big business
and fossil fuel-based energy production;" and (3) the extensive
discretion that governmental agencies have in allocating natural
resources.16 These are not simple problems to overcome, but as
12. See, e.g., Eric Pooley, Why the Climate Bill Failed, TIME (June 9, 2008),
http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1812836,00.html
("Just about every
Senator who spoke last week, Democrat and Republican alike, wanted to be on record
saying that climate change is real and must be dealt with. But far too few were willing to
debate the solutions to the crisis . . . .").
13. For example, the Lieberman-Warner Climate Security Act, S. 2191, 110th Cong.
(2008), and the American Clean Energy and Security Act, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. (2009),
both failed to pass in the Senate. See S. 3036 (110th): Lieberman-Warner Climate Security
Act of 2008, GOVTRACK.US, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/110/s3036 (last visited
Nov. 15, 2013); H.R. 2454 (111th): American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009,
GOVTRACK.US, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/111/hr2454 (last updated Feb. 03,
2013). The United States never ratified the Kyoto Protocol, see Status of Ratification of the
Kyoto Protocol, U.N. FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE,
http://unfccc.int/kyoto-protocol/status-ofratification/items/2613.php (last visited Nov 15,
2013), and generally has played an obstructionist role in global efforts to curb greenhouse
gas emissions. See, e.g., Christopher Martin & Frederic Tomesco, U.S. Delegates Walk Out
of Montreal Climate Talks, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 9, 2005), http://www.bloomberg.com
/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=avcRE.FLAYpQ&refer=us; see also Mary Christina
Wood, Atmospheric Trust Litigation Around the World, in FIDUCIARY DUTY AND THE
ATMOSPHERIC TRUST 99, 103 (Ken Coghill, Charles Sampford, & Tim Smith eds., 2012)
[hereinafter Wood I] (describing the United States as "a recalcitrant global polluter,
having offered only a meagre reduction proposal [of two percent below 1990 levels] at the
Copenhagen Conference," where the international community attempted to negotiate a
new climate treaty).
14. See Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective
Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471, 474 (1970) ("Our legal system tends to
provide specific and limited responses to particular problems .... [E]nvironmental
problems will remain untouched until some dramatic event mobilizes public opinion and
leads to legislative and administrative action.").
15. See id. at 560 ("[S]elf-interested and powerful minorities often have an undue
influence on the public resource decisions of legislative and administrative bodies and
cause those bodies to ignore broadly based public interests."); Wood 1, supra note 13, at
104 ("Congress remains beholden to the fossil fuel industry, which spent a whopping $514
million over eighteen months lobbying against a climate bill, until prospects for legislation
came to a 'crashing demise' in summer, 2010.").
16. See Mary Christina Wood, Advancing the Sovereign Trust of Government to
Safeguard the Environment for Present and Future Generations (Part I): Ecological
Realism and the Need for a ParadigmShift, 39 ENVTL. L. 43, 55 (2009) [hereinafter Wood
II] ("The modern environmental administrative state is geared almost entirely to the
legalization of natural resource damage. In nearly every statutory scheme, the
implementing agency has the authority-or discretion-to permit the very pollution or
land destruction that the statutes were designed to prevent."); Mary Christina Wood,
Advancing the Sovereign Trust of Government to Safeguard the Environment for Present
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climate variability increases-and as the effects become more and
more severe-society must take action to mitigate the impacts of
increased greenhouse gases in the atmosphere and to adapt to the
changes that cannot be avoided.
One compelling proposal for overcoming these obstacles
contemplates expanding upon existing common law-specifically the
public trust doctrine-to recognize the atmosphere as an asset to be
held in trust by the government for the benefit of current and future
generations." Such an expansion of this doctrine (the "Atmospheric
Trust") would impose an affirmative duty on state governments to
regulate carbon emissions within their jurisdictions." By substituting
language of legal obligation for the current rhetoric of agency
discretion and political partisanship, implementation of this proposal
would put the debate over whether to take action on climate change
squarely behind us, and instead focus the national conversation on
what to do about it.
This Comment suggests that the Atmospheric Trust proposal,
though compelling, has flaws that may undercut its viability in
addressing the climate crisis. First, the public trust doctrine itself is
built on shaky historical precedent, and it has been applied
inconsistently and with great variation among the states, making
universal expansion of the doctrine challenging. Second, this type of
expansion raises significant theoretical concerns, such as the risk of
weakening the doctrine into a general police power or placing the fate
of a resource as important as the atmosphere in the hands of the
judiciary, which is generally unaccountable to the public. Third, and
perhaps most important, the Atmospheric Trust proposal would face
a variety of political obstacles that could inhibit its effectiveness even
if adopted. As an example, this Comment will examine the feasibility
and Future Generations (Part II): Instilling a Fiduciary Obligation in Governance, 39
ENVTL. L. 91, 105 (2009) [hereinafter Wood III] ("[M]uch of the environmental agencies'
present workload consists of issuing permits for ecological damage."). The second and
third of these obstacles to effective governmental action on climate change are inherently
related, as broad agency discretion, enabled by modern judicial deference to agency
decisions, necessarily "invites undue political influence" through lobbying of agency
officials. Mary Christina Wood, Symposium, Key Note Address: Government's
Atmospheric Trust Responsibility, 22 ENVTL. L. LITIG. 369, 374 (2007) [hereinafter Wood
IV]; see also Mary Christina Wood, Nature's Trust: Reclaiming an Environmental
Discourse, 25 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 243, 254 (2007) [hereinafter Wood V] (noting the conflict
between administrative agencies' purpose to "use their discretion to serve the interests of
the public" and the realty that administrative decision making can be used to "further
political ends").
17. See infra Part II.A.
18. See Wood IV, supranote 16, at 373; Wood V, supra note 16, at 261-62.
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of implementing the proposal in a state like North Carolina-a state
whose public trust doctrine is already quite limited, whose courts are
unlikely to adopt such an expansive interpretation of precedent, and
whose legislature would likely step in to prevent such expansion even
if adopted by the courts. Given the obstacles this theory would face in
North Carolina and politically similar states, this Comment argues
that successful expansion of the doctrine in even a handful of
jurisdictions would create pockets of Atmospheric Trusts across the
country, all of which would be interpreted and implemented
differently.
Given these drawbacks to the theory and its practical application,
this Comment posits that efforts to promote the Atmospheric Trust
may be futile in certain jurisdictions and even could prove
counterproductive to the ultimate goal of addressing climate change.
Given the current state of the climate, time is of the essence. Time
and effort should not be diverted away from developing a practical
approach that may be better suited to the legal and political realities
that exist in states like North Carolina."
Analysis proceeds in three parts. Part I provides an overview of
the traditional public trust doctrine, its historical roots, and its
adoption in the United States. Part II examines the proposal to
expand the doctrine to include protection of the atmosphere and this
proposal's success in state and federal litigation to date. Part III
compares the traditional public trust doctrine to the Atmospheric
Trust theory and considers the legal, practical, and public policy
implications of such an expansion. Finally, this Comment uses North
Carolina as a case study to analyze the wisdom and practical
feasibility of attempting to expand the doctrine in a state that has an
elected judiciary and a state legislature with a demonstrated hostility
to climate action.
I. THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE
The public trust doctrine is a curious creature of American
common law that was derived from principles of ancient Roman and
English law.20 The doctrine applies traditional trust law concepts to
the relationship between the government and its citizenry in order to

19. Other possible solutions-whether they involve lobbying Congress for
comprehensive climate legislation, seeking broader international action, or finding a new
legal theory under which the climate could be regulated by the states-are beyond the
scope of this Comment.
20. See infra Part I.A.
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ensure proper management of certain essential natural resources. 2'
Under the contemporary formulation of the public trust doctrine, the
State is a sovereign trustee, charged with management and protection
of these resources, as trust assets, for the benefit of the public. 22 All
citizens, constituting the trust beneficiaries, are entitled to access and
use these resources for public purposes, traditionally defined as
navigation, commerce, and fishing. In order to maintain the proper
level of public access and use, the government is generally restricted
in its ability to sell or otherwise convey these resources to private
parties.24 Outside of these foundational principles, however, the
public trust doctrine is largely a question of state law, and its
application in any given jurisdiction varies in terms of the specific
obligations imposed on government, the range of resources protected
as trust assets, and the ability of the public to enforce the terms of the
trust.25
A.

HistoricalOrigins of the Public Trust Doctrine

The public trust doctrine is often characterized as a
contemporary form of an English common law doctrine, which in turn
evolved from ancient Roman law. 26 The underlying principles of the
doctrine are typically cited as having their roots in Roman civil law at
the time of Emperor Justinian.27 As expressed in Book II of
21. See Christopher Brown, A Litigious Proposal: A Citizen's Duty to Challenge
Climate Change, Lessons from Recent FederalStanding Analysis, and Possible State-Level
Remedies PrivateCitizens Can Pursue,25 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 385,445 (2010).
22. See id.
23. See Robin Kundis Craig, Adapting to Climate Change: The PotentialRole of State
Common-Law Public Trust Doctrines,34 VT. L. REV. 781, 784 (2010) [hereinafter Craig 1].
24. See id.; see also Sax, supra note 14, at 477 ("Three types of restrictions on
governmental authority are often thought to be imposed by the public trust: first, the
property subject to the trust must not only be used for a public purpose, but it must be
held available for use by the general public; second, the property may not be sold, even for
a fair cash equivalent; and third, the property must be maintained for particular types of
uses." (footnote omitted)).
25. See infra Part I.C.
26. See, e.g., PPL Mont., L.L.C. v. Montana, 132 S. Ct. 1215, 1234 (2012); Craig I,
supra note 23, at 798; Sax, supra note 14, at 475.
27. See, e.g., Karl S. Coplan, Public Trust Limits on Greenhouse Gas TradingSchemes:
A Sustainable Middle Ground?, 35 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 287, 305 (2010); Richard J.
Lazarus, Changing Conceptions of Property and Sovereignty in Natural Resources:
Questioning the Public Trust Doctrine, 71 IOWA L. REV. 631, 632 (1986); Gregory S.
Munro, The Public Trust Doctrine and the Montana Constitution as Legal Bases for
Climate Change Litigation in Montana, 73 MONT. L. REV. 123, 136 (2012); Wood II, supra
note 16, at 69. Some scholars argue the doctrine's roots can be traced back an additional
hundred years to Emperor Marcian. See, e.g., James L. Huffman, Speaking of Inconvenient
Truths - A History of the Public Trust Doctrine, 18 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 1, 16
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Justinian's Institutes,2 8 certain natural resources were considered
inherently common property, or res communes.29 Access could not be
denied to these resources of common ownership, and usufructuary
rights30 were vested in the public for uses such as fishing and
navigation."
These underlying Justinian principles of common property and
public rights influenced the development of English common law
concerning public access to navigable waterways.3 2 The public trust
doctrine was first introduced in the writings of Henry de Bracton,
who drew from Justinian's Institutes to introduce the notion of the
public trust to English law. This developed into a common law
doctrine that vested title to all lands beneath navigable waters in the
king,34 "subject to a common right of use for navigation and fishing."

(2007) ("[Tlhe concept of 'things common to all' originated with the third century jurist
Marcian....").
28. Justinian's Institutes are a compilation of "classical institutional works," "classical
commentaries," and "imperial legislation" from the time of Emperor Justinian,
promulgated in 533 A.D. See J. INST. vii-ix (J.A.C. Thomas trans., 1975). The Institutes
were "designed as an introductory, simple exposition of the general principles of (in the
main) private law for students embarking upon the study of law." Id. at vii (footnote
omitted).
29. Id. at 2.1.1 ("Now the things which are, by natural law, common to all are these:
the air, running water, the sea and therefore the seashores."). "Res" is defined as "[t]he
subject matter of a trust" which is "[a]n object, interest, or status, as opposed to a person."
BLACK'S LAW DICrIONARY 1420 (9th ed. 2009). "Res communes" is defined as "[t]hings
common to all; things that cannot be owned or appropriated, such as light, air, and the
sea." Id. at 1421.
30. A usufructuary right is a "right for a certain period to use and enjoy the fruits of
another's property without damaging or diminishing it, but allowing for any natural
deterioration in the property over time." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1684 (9th ed. 2009).
31. See J. INST. 2.1.1-2.1.5; see also Huffman, supra note 27, at 9 ("Roman law, as
communicated to us across the centuries by Justinian, recognized and protected public
rights in especially important natural resources."); Lazarus, supra note 27, at 632 ("The
public trust doctrine is based on an amorphous notion that has been with us since the days
of Justinian-the notion that the public possesses inviolable rights in certain natural
resources."). But see Sax, supra note 14, at 475 (quoting R. LEE, THE ELEMENTS OF
ROMAN LAW 109 (4th ed. 1956)) ("One text suggests that [the seashore] was the property
of the Roman people. More often it is regarded as owned by no one, the public having
undefined rights of use and enjoyment.").
32. See Huffman, supra note 27, at 19, 25; Lazarus, supra note 27, at 635.
33. See Huffman, supra note 27, at 19; Lazarus, supra note 27, at 635.
34. The English common law test of navigability was based on the ebb and flow of
ocean tides. See, e.g., Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 435 (1892) ("In England
the ebb and flow of the tide constitute the legal test of the navigability of waters. There no
waters are navigable in fact, at least to any great extent, which are not subject to the
tide."); Barney v. Keokuk, 94 U.S. 324, 336 (1877) ("[I]n England, no waters are deemed
navigable except those in which the tide ebbs and flows.").
35. Huffman, supranote 27, at 77.
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These public rights prohibited the king from alienating those
submerged lands.36
The contemporary public trust doctrine, however, is a product of
substantial expansion and varied application of these Roman and
English roots." First, it is not clear that the rights described in
Justinian's Institutes were either absolute or enforceable.38 While the
Institutes characterize air and water resources as common property,
they do not expressly establish the State as a trustee-responsible for
the protection of that property or liable for interferences with the
public's rights to its access and use-as that evolution is widely
understood to have developed in the American courts." Additionally,
the Institutes may not in fact represent Roman law as it actually
operated at the time of Justinian, but may rather serve to express
"Justinian's own idealization of a legal regime."4 0
Furthermore, the extent to which English common law was
actually concerned with public rights to resources is questionable.
Submerged lands subject to the English public trust doctrine could
still be acquired by prescription, and the king retained power to grant
title or exclusive use rights "for the purpose of promoting navigation
and commerce."4 1 Indeed, such acquisitions and conveyances were so
pervasive that some scholars argue the English common law did not,
in effect, actually establish public fishing rights or constraints on

36. See Sax, supra note 14, at 476.
37. See id. at 556-57 ("It is clear the historical scope of public trust law is quite narrow
.... Certainly the principle of the public trust is broader than its traditional application
indicates."); see also Lazarus, supranote 27, at 657 ("[T]he viability of the ancient roots is
largely irrelevant to the doctrine's current application, apart from presenting 'seeds of
ideas.' "). But see Huffman, supra note 27, at 37-39 (describing how the first major
American public trust doctrine case cited de Bracton, among others, as precedent).
38. See, e.g., Patrick Deveney, Title, Jus Publicum,and the Public Trust: An Historical
Analysis, 1 SEA GRANT L.J. 13, 29 (1976) ("In actuality, the sea and the seashore were
'common to all' only insofar as they were not yet appropriated to the use of anyone or
allocated by the state." (emphasis in original omitted)); Huffman, supra note 27, at 15
("Roman law did not really guarantee an inalienable public right to use and access the sea
and seashore .... ").
39. See Sax, supra note 14, at 475 ("[I]t has never been clear whether the public had
an enforceable right to prevent infringement of those interests ... [, and] no evidence is
available that public rights could be legally asserted against a recalcitrant government.").
Indeed, Professor James Huffman argues that the Roman concept of common property
and public rights is entirely distinct from what we now consider it to be. See Huffman,
supra note 27, at 18.
40. Lazarus, supra note 27, at 633-34. "Justinian may not have been stating the law as
it was in fact...." Huffman, supra note 27, at 15. "[T]his Golden Age existed only in
legend and myth." Id. at 18-19.
41. Huffman, supra note 27, at 77.
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private ownership of submerged lands. 42 The so-called English roots
of today's public trust doctrine were more about the king's ownership
and control of lands than they were about common resources and
public rights.43
Considered together, these historical doctrines are best
characterized as the "seeds of ideas" for the formulation of certain
elements of the modern American public trust doctrine." In
particular, the idea that certain natural resources are inherently
important to all people is consistently recognized throughout this
history, as is the notion that certain public uses of those resources
deserve protection.45
B.

Adoption of the Public Trust Doctrinein the United States

The public trust doctrine made its first major appearance in
American jurisprudence in the early 1800s, in Arnold v. Mundy. 46 The
case involved a disputed title to an oyster bed which the plaintiff had
planted on a riverbed adjacent to his property. 47 Holding that the
landowner never held legal title to the river or the land beneath it
because such resources were "vested in the people of" the state,48
Chief Justice Kirkpatrick of the New Jersey Supreme Court
announced a legal principle which would serve as the framework for
our contemporary formulation of the public trust doctrine. 49 His
analysis represents the first American adoption of the doctrine's
common law precedent, closely tracking the rationale and language of
its Roman and English rootsso:
42. See id. at 26 ("[T]here is no public right to fish in navigable waters, though the
public may be granted the liberty to do so."); id. at 35 ("[Tlhe Crown's claim of title to
submerged lands had nothing to do with protecting the public's interest in navigating and
fishing the overlying waters.").
43. See, e.g., JOSH EAGLE, COASTAL LAW 194 (2011) ("Perhaps the most significant
difference between the Roman and British law constructs of the public trust doctrine is
that, under the British version, the King is presumed to own all property while, under the
Roman version, certain property is deemed to be communally owned."); Lazarus, supra
note 27, at 635 ("[A]lthough in some sense English common law recognized public rights
in the shorezone area, they were, at bottom, rights controlled by the sovereign."); Sax,
supra note 14, at 485 ("[O]nly the most manipulative of historical readers could extract
much binding precedent from what happened a few centuries ago in England.").
44. See Sax, supra note 14, at 485.
45. See id. at 476-77.
46. 6 N.J.L. 1 (1821).
47. Id. at 65.
48. Id. at 78.
49. See Huffman, supra note 27, at 37.
50. Indeed, the opinion directly references the writings of Bracton and Justinian as
support for this new rule of law. See Arnold, 6 N.J.L. at 72.

246

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 92

[T]he nation does not possess all [property] in the same manner
.... [Some] remain[s] common to all the citizens, who take of
them and use them, each according to his necessities, and
according to the laws which regulate their use, and are called
common property."
Chief Justice Kirkpatrick's opinion can also be viewed as the first
American expansion of the common law doctrine, introducing the
notion of an obligation for the government to hold these common
resources in trust for the benefit of the public.52
The United States Supreme Court first considered the public
trust doctrine in Martin v. Waddell,53 yet another case involving title to
a submerged oyster bed. The Court considered the doctrine again in
its 1892 landmark decision on the public trust doctrine, Illinois
Central Railroad Co. v. Illinois.54 This case resolved a dispute over
title to the bed of Lake Michigan, after the waters of the lake
"reclaimed" much of the shoreline, which the state of Illinois had
granted to a private railroad company." The Court held that Illinois
had no authority to convey these parcels of land to a private party
because its own title to them was subject to the public trust doctrine,
under which the state held such resources for the benefit of the
public.56
The Illinois Central Court expanded upon the English common
law governing title to submerged lands;57 it extended the public trust
doctrine to all navigable waters-including freshwater lakes such as
Lake Michigan-rather than just those susceptible to the ebb and
51. Id. at 71 (emphasis omitted).
52. See id. ("But inasmuch as the things which constitute this common property are
things in which a sort of transient usufructuary possession, only, can be had ... the wisdom
of that law has placed it in the hands of the sovereign power, to be held, protected, and
regulated for the common use and benefit." (emphasis omitted)).
53. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367 (1842).
54. 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
55. See id. at 433-34.
56. "The trust devolving upon the State for the public, and which can only be
discharged by the management and control of property in which the public has an interest,
cannot be relinquished by a transfer of the property . . . ." Id. at 453. The Court ultimately
held, "[A]ny attempted cession of the ownership and control of the State in and over the
submerged lands in Lake Michigan, by the act of April 16, 1869, was inoperative to affect,
modify or in any respect to control the sovereignty and dominion of the State over the
lands, or its ownership thereof." Id. at 460.
57. See Huffman, supra note 27, at 59 (describing the English common law on
submerged lands and how Illinois Central differs). The Illinois Central Court's expansion
upon the English doctrine was really a product of the doctrine's incremental expansion
carried out by American courts in cases leading up to the Illinois Centralcase. See EAGLE,
supra note 43, at 196.
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flow of the ocean tides." The opinion characterized the primary
purpose of the doctrine as protecting resources in which the public
has an inherent interest. In particular, the Court emphasized the
importance of public use of navigable waters for commerce,
navigation, and fishing, and the corresponding need for the
government to own and protect such resources against private
encroachment. 60
Illinois Central did not, however, establish a rule of law that
prohibits states from conveying public trust lands absolutely. The
Court expressly provided that the public trust doctrine's restriction on
alienation of such land is governed instead by a rule of functionality":
The trust with which [these properties] are held, therefore, is
governmental and cannot be alienated, except in those instances
mentioned of parcels used in the improvement of the interest
thus held, or when parcels can be disposed of without detriment
to the public interestin the lands and waters remaining.62

On one hand, this "lodestar"63 Supreme Court decision on the public
trust doctrine serves as a recognition that certain resources may be
too important to the public interest to be deeded over to private
58. See Illinois Central, 146 U.S. at 435-36 ("At one time the existence of tide waters
was deemed essential in determining the admiralty jurisdiction of courts in England. That
doctrine is now repudiated in this country as wholly inapplicable to our condition .... The
doctrine is founded upon the necessity of preserving to the public the use of navigable
waters from private interruption and encroachment, a reason as applicable to navigable
fresh waters as to waters moved by the tide.").
59. See id. at 455-56 ("The ownership of the navigable waters of the harbor and of the
lands under them is a subject of public concern to the whole people of the State ... . This
follows necessarily from the public character of the property, being held by the whole
people for purposes in which the whole people are interested.").
60. See id. at 452 ("[Ilt is a title different in character from that which the State holds
in lands intended for sale . .. . It is a title held in trust for the people of the State that they
may enjoy the navigation of the waters, carry on commerce over them, and have liberty of
fishing therein freed from the obstruction or interference of private parties."). But see
Richard A. Epstein, The Public Trust Doctrine, 7 CATO J. 411, 424-25 (1987) (arguing that
the Illinois Central decision was motivated more by judicial concern over the potential for
legislative abuse of power and whether the state had received just compensation); Lazarus,
supra note 27, at 656 ("The precise object of concern . .. in Illinois Central ... was corrupt
or shortsighted state legislatures.").
61. See, e.g., Huffman, supranote 27, at 56-57 ("No less than five times in the opinion,
Justice Field expressly states that submerged and coastal lands affected with a public trust
can be alienated. Indeed, he notes that it is often in the public interest for the state to do
so.").
62. Illinois Central,146 U.S. at 455-56 (emphasis added).
63. Lazarus, supra note 27, at 640 (quoting Sax, supra note 14, at 489); see also
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1026 (9th ed. 2009) (defining "lodestar" as a "guiding star; an
inspiration or model").
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corporations.' On the other hand, by allowing states to deed away
submerged lands upon a finding that such conveyance will not be a
"detriment to the public interest,"6 5 the Court essentially conflated
the concept of the government's general regulatory authority under
its police power66 with that of the public trust doctrine's discrete
obligations arising from traditional property and trust law.67
C.

State-Specific Public Trust Doctrines

The contours of the public trust doctrine are predominantly
determined by state-rather than federal-common law.68 This
distinction is largely the result of the historical role of states in
managing resources like water and wildlife.69 Thus, every state's
doctrine has evolved in parallel, each forming a distinct set of
protected resources and public uses, as well as unique mechanisms of
enforcing the obligations imposed on the government. When viewed
broadly, there are common threads that tie these independent state
doctrines together; however, their differences ultimately may prove to
be determinative of whether they can be used to address the climate
crisis.
1. Overview of State Doctrines
Although each state's doctrine is unique, the approaches to
trustee duties and obligations can be categorized into two main
64. See Lazarus, supra note 27, at 639 ("According to the Court, at some level a state
legislature is powerless to convey into private hands a natural resource as important as
Chicago's harbor.").
65. Illinois Central,146 U.S. at 456.
66. The government's police power has historically been defined as "the imposition of
a wholesome restraint upon the[] exercise [of private rights], such a restraint as will
prevent the infliction of injury upon others in the enjoyment of them." CHRISTOPHER G.
TIEDEMAN, A TREATISE ON THE LIMITATIONS OF POLICE POWER IN THE UNITED

STATES 2 (1886). It is often characterized as a dual discretionary power to prohibit
wrongful conduct and to regulate rightful conduct of individuals. See, e.g., Randy E.
Barnett, The ProperScope of the Police Power, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 429, 430, 475,
483, 493 (2004). For more on the distinction between the police power and the public trust
doctrine, see infra Part III.A.
67. See Huffman, supra note 27, at 58-59.
68. See PPL Mont., L.L.C. v. Montana, 132 S. Ct. 1215, 1235 (2012); District of
Columbia v. Air Fla., Inc., 750 F.2d 1077, 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Alec L. v. Jackson, 863 F.
Supp. 2d 11, 15 (D.D.C. 2012); see also Appleby v. New York, 271 U.S. 364, 395 (1926)
(stating that the Illinois Central decision was not an announcement of a federal public trust
doctrine, but rather that "the conclusion reached was necessarily a statement of Illinois
law"); Huffman, supra note 27, at 63 ("Indeed, the nature and extent of the public trust in
navigable waters were understood by everyone, including the United States Supreme
Court, to be questions of state law.").
69. See Wood I, supra note 13, at 107-08.
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groups: (1) those that view the doctrine as less stringent and simply
limit the government's ability to take actions which "adversely affect
trust concerns";"o and (2) those that view it as more restrictive and
impose an affirmative duty on the government to guard, maintain,
and restore trust resources actively. 71
The former category is the majority approach, under which most
states generally restrict the government's ability to degrade trust
assets through one of three standards. 72 The first and most lenient
standard requires "some relationship between the proposed
governmental action and a legitimate public purpose" in order for the
government to degrade the resource at issue-in essence, a
reiteration of the state's general police power. 73 The second type of
standard requires the government to consider the full potential
consequences of its actions and prevents it from proceeding if such
action would result in "substantial impairment" to the trust assets,
rising above the level of "minimal" harm or "limited
encroachments." 74 The third and most stringent type of standard
requires the legislature to maintain the natural resources that fall
within the public trust 75 and to provide "[c]lear [s]tatutory
[a]uthority" before the government can take any action which would
harm the trust.

70. See Lazarus, supra note 27, at 650.
71. Lazarus, supra note 27, at 650; see also State v. Zimring, 566 P.2d 725, 735 (Haw.
1977) ("Under public trust principles, the State as trustee has the duty to protect and
maintain the trust property and regulate its use. Presumptively, this duty is to be
implemented by devoting the land to actual public uses, e.g., recreation." (footnote
omitted)); Wood I,supra note 13, at 106 ("The legislature is primary trustee; the executive
branch, acting as agent of the trustee, is vested with the same public trust obligation.").
72. See Lazarus, supra note 27, at 650-51.
73. See id. at 651.
74. Id. at 652-53; see also Long Beach v. Mansell, 476 P.2d 423, 439 (Cal. 1970)
("[O]nly a small portion of the original trust grant was being freed from the public trust
.... We cannot interfere with the Legislature's decision that the public easement may be
abrogated as to this relatively small parcel." (citing Atwood v. Hammond, 48 P.2d 20, 26
(Cal. 1935))); Morse v. Oregon Div. of State Lands, 590 P.2d 709, 712 (Or. 1979) ("There
is nothing in the public trust doctrine as espoused by Illinois Central or Shively which
limits fills of the present kind to those for water-related uses. There is no grant here to a
private party which results in such substantial impairment of the public's interest as would
be beyond the power of the legislature to authorize."); Hixon v. Pub. Serv. Comn'n, 146
N.W.2d 577, 582 (Wis. 1966) ("While the state of Wisconsin holds the beds of navigable
waters in trust for all its citizens, the legislature may authorize limited encroachments
upon the beds of such waters where the public interest will be served." (footnotes
omitted)).
75. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
76. Lazarus, supra note 27, at 654.
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The extent to which each state views the underlying common law
as flexible has largely determined how that state's public trust
doctrine evolved.77 As discussed in the previous section, the public
trust doctrine-in its original manifestation-contemplated the
government holding only submerged lands beneath navigable waters
in trust for the benefit of the public.78 However, as the doctrine has
been considered and applied across the fifty states, it has in some
instances grown to encompass additional natural resources as trust
assets. A narrow example of this type of expansion is incorporation of
the dry sand beach area into the trust "corpus." 79 In contrast, the
broadest example is extension of the doctrine to cover all natural
resources."o In the middle of these two extremes, state courts have
extended application of the public trust doctrine to protect resources
such as wildlife8 ' and water quality.82 Additionally, the classic public
trust doctrine protected the public's right of access to protected
resources for the limited purposes of navigation, commerce, and
77. See, e.g., Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 374, 380 (Cal. 1971) ("The public uses to
which tidelands are subject are sufficiently flexible to encompass changing public needs. In
administering the trust the state is not burdened with an outmoded classification favoring
one mode of utilization over another."); In re Water Use Permit Applications, 9 P.3d 409,
447 (Haw. 2000) ("The public trust, by its very nature, does not remain fixed for all time,
but must conform to changing needs and circumstances."); Matthews v. Bay Head
Improvement Ass'n, 471 A.2d 355, 365 (N.J. 1984) ("Archaic judicial responses are not an
answer to a modern social problem. Rather, we perceive the public trust doctrine not to be
'fixed or static,' but one to 'be molded and extended to meet changing conditions and
needs of the public it was created to benefit.' "); Weden v. San Juan Cnty., 958 P.2d 273,
283 (Wash. 1998) ("Since as early as 1821, the public trust doctrine has been applied
throughout the United States 'as a flexible method for judicial protection of public
interests in coastal lands and waters.' ").
78. See supraPart I.B.
79. See, e.g., Matthews, 471 A.2d at 365-66.
80. See, e.g., Save Ourselves, Inc., v. La. Envt'1 Control Comm'n, 452 So. 2d 1152,
1154 (La. 1984).
81. See, e.g., In re Complaint of Steuart Transp. Co., 495 F. Supp. 38, 40 (E.D. Va.
1980); Baxley v. State, 958 P.2d 422, 434 (Alaska 1998); United States v. State Water Res.
Control Bd., 182 Cal. App. 3d 82, 150 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986). The case of Geer v.
Connecticut is often cited by proponents of further expansion of the doctrine to include
wildlife. See Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 529 (1896), overruled by Hughes v.
Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 325 (1979) (holding that states do not own wildlife). However,
Geer focused on the concept of the wildlife trust, a government responsibility which is
historically distinct from the public trust doctrine. See MICHAEL J. BEAN & MELANIE J.
ROWLAND, THE EVOLUTION OF NATIONAL WILDLIFE LAW 14-15 (3d ed. 1997).

82. See, e.g., Nat'l Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709, 728 (Cal. 1983)
(discussing a state's water rights); Robinson v. Ariyoshi, 658 P.2d 287, 311-12 (Haw. 1982);
United Plainsmen Ass'n v. N.D. State Water Conservation Comm'n, 247 N.W.2d 457, 463
(N.D. 1976); see also Lazarus, supra note 27, at 648 ("The result has been a dramatic
movement in the geographical application of the trust doctrine away from submerged
navigable beds to water resources generally.").
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fishing.83 This limited concept of public use has been expanded in
many states to ensure the public's right to recreation and aesthetic
enjoyment of the state's protected resources."
2. North Carolina's Public Trust Doctrine
In contrast with the states that have expanded their doctrines to
protect additional resources, North Carolina has simultaneously
limited the scope of the classic formulation of the public trust
doctrine and strengthened its protections of the resources that remain
within that scope. In order for the lands beneath a body of water to
come under the purview of the state's doctrine, the waters above must
be "navigable in fact"-defined in the landmark North Carolina
public trust doctrine case, Gwathmey v. Department of Environment,
Health & Natural Resources," as navigable "by useful vessels,

including small craft used for pleasure."8 6 This constitutes a rejection
of the "common law tidal test," which defined navigable waters as
those affected by the ebb and flow of the ocean tides"-a test that the
Illinois Central Court expanded upon," and which many states have
expressly adopted."
Additionally, North Carolina courts have adopted a narrow
reading of the navigability test announced by the United States
83. See supra Part I.B.
84. See, e.g., Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 374, 380 (Cal. 1971); Borough of Neptune
City v. Borough of Avon-by-the-Sea, 294 A.2d 47, 54 (N.J. 1972).
85. 342 N.C. 287, 464 S.E.2d 674 (1995).
86. Id. at 300, 464 S.E.2d at 682; see also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 146-64(4) (2011) (defining
navigable waters as "all waters which are navigable in fact"). Gwathmey goes on to clarify:
"[I]f a body of water in its natural condition can be navigated by watercraft, it is navigable
in fact and, therefore, navigable in law, even if it has not been used for such purpose.
Lands lying beneath such waters that are navigable in law are the subject of the public
trust doctrine." Gwathmey, 342 N.C. at 301, 464 S.E.2d at 682.
87. See supra notes 31-34 and accompanying text (describing the English common law
navigability test as based on the ebb and flow of the tides).
88. See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text (describing Illinois Central's
expansion on the English navigability test).
89. See Robin Kundis Craig, A Comparative Guide to the Eastern Public Trust
Doctrines: Classifications of States, Property Rights, and State Summaries, 16 PENN. ST.
ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 11-14 (2007); see also Hirsch v. Maryland Dep't of Natural Res., Water
Res. Div., 416 A.2d 10, 12 (Md. 1980) ("Navigable water has traditionally been defined in
Maryland as water subject to the ebb and flow of the tide."); Brosnan v. Gage, 133 N.E.
622, 624 (Mass. 1921) ("Upon the reported evidence it appears that the Merrimack river
... is navigable in fact, in the sense that it is and long has been used for useful purposes of
navigation-that is, for trade and travel in the usual and ordinary modes-but is not a
navigable river above the dam in the sense that the tide there ebbs and flows."); EAGLE,
supra note 43, at 83 (using Gwathmey as an example of a state limiting the geographic
scope of its public trust doctrine).
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Supreme Court in 1874, which stated that "[t]he capability of use by
the public for purposes of transportation and commerce affords the
true criterion of the navigability of a river, ratherthan the extent and
manner of that use.""o For example, in 2009, the North Carolina Court
of Appeals held that a lake was not subject to the public trust
doctrine because its tributary, Crane Creek, was not navigable in
fact. 91 Even though kayakers could navigate "small watercraft at
various points upstream from the lake," the court held there was an
"absence of evidence tending to show that the stream in question
[was] passable by watercraft over an extended distance both upstream
of, under the surface of, and downstream from the lake."92
Despite North Carolina's generally narrow interpretation of the
navigability test, North Carolina courts "do[] not discriminate
between natural and artificial waterways."93 In Fish House, Inc. v.
Clarke,94 the North Carolina Court of Appeals quoted the Division of
Coastal Management's CAMA handbook, which defines public trust
areas broadly, including not only natural navigable waters but also
"all waters in artificially created water bodies where the public has
acquired rights by prescription, custom, usage, dedication or any
other means." 95
While North Carolina has generally limited the types of
waterways which are protected under its public trust doctrine, it has
90. The Montello, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 430, 441 (1874) (emphasis added) ("It would be a
narrow rule to hold that in this country, unless a river was capable of being navigated by
steam or sail vessels, it could not be treated as a public highway."). However, this
navigability test was announced in the context of determining federal courts' admiralty
power, and thus is not directly applicable to the question of a state's definition of
navigability for the purposes of its public trust doctrine. "Under accepted principles of
federalism, the States retain residual power to determine the scope of the public trust over
waters within their borders, while federal law determines riverbed title under the equalfooting doctrine." PPL Mont., L.L.C. v. Montana, 132 S. Ct. 1215, 1235 (2012).
91. Bauman v. Woodlake Partners, LLC, 199 N.C. App. 441, 453, 681 S.E.2d 819, 827

(2009).

92. Id. (emphasis added). Similarly, in 1859, the Supreme Court of North Carolina
held that a portion of the Yadkin River was not navigable, despite being used by canoes
and flats carrying goods such as limes and flour, because it "was not navigable in fact for
sea vessels, and, therefore, is not a watercourse altogether publici juris." State v. Glen, 52
N.C. (7 Jones) 321, 326 (1859).
93. Fish House, Inc. v. Clarke, 204 N.C. App. 130, 135, 693 S.E.2d 208, 212 (2010).
94. 204 N.C. App. 130, 693 S.E.2d 208 (2010).
95. Id. at 135, 693 S.E.2d at 213 (internal quotation marks omitted). The CAMA
handbook "is a guide to the permit program," which is set up by the Coastal Resources
Commission under the state's Coastal Area Management Act. Div. OF COASTAL MGMT.,
N.C. DEP'T OF ENV'T & NATURAL RES., CAMA HANDBOOK FOR DEVELOPMENT IN
COASTAL NORTH CAROLINA: INTRODUcTION (2007), available at http://dcm2.enr.state
.nc.us/Handbook/howtouse.htm.
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also expanded upon the classic doctrine in order to protect public
access to such waters for recreational purposes such as swimming and
hunting, in addition to the traditional purposes of navigation,
commerce, and fishing.96 Thus, although this is an expansion of the
purposes for which public access and use were traditionally protected,
its effect is limited in that these rights only exist in the context of
waters which are navigable in fact; the public still has no express right
of access or use in regards to other natural resources such as nonnavigable waterways, wildlife, public lands, or air quality.
North Carolina follows the majority approach to imposing
trustee obligations on the government through the third type of
standard described above." While it does not appear to impose an
affirmative duty to protect or restore trust resources like the stricter
minority, the state does require "a special grant of the General
Assembly . .. in the clearest and most express terms" in order for the

government to withdraw submerged lands from the protection of the
doctrine and convey them in fee simple to private parties.98 Absent
such express authorization from the legislature, public trust resources
conveyed by the government are presumed to remain subject to the
public's right of access.99 This principle extends to prohibit private
acquisition of public trust lands by adverse possession or
prescription.100
As a result, North Carolina has a fairly strong public trust
doctrine as applied to coastal lands and navigable rivers, yet it is
96. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-45.1 (2011) ("As used in this section, 'public trust rights'
means those rights held in trust by the State for the use and benefit of the people of the
State in common . . . . They include, but are not limited to, the right to navigate, swim, hunt,
fish, and enjoy all recreationalactivities in the watercourses of the State and the right to
freely use and enjoy the State's ocean and estuarine beaches and public access to the
beaches." (emphasis added)). Beaches are broadly defined by statute to include both "the
wet sand area of the beach that is subject to regular flooding by tides and the dry sand area
of the beach that is subject to occasional flooding by tides, including wind tides ....
Natural indicators of the landward extent of the ocean beaches include, but are not limited
to, the first line of stable, natural vegetation; the toe of the frontal dune; and the storm
trash line." Id. § 77-20(e).
97. See supra text accompanying notes 75-76.
98. Gwathmey v. Dep't of Env't, Health & Natural Res., 342 N.C. 287, 304, 464 S.E.2d
674, 684 (1995) (emphasis added). However, only the government has standing to enforce
the trust, meaning it is simultaneously the regulator and the regulated-which may
operate to limit its overall effectiveness. See generally Town of Nags Head v. Cherry, Inc.,
-

N.C. App. _, _,

723 S.E.2d 156, 161 (2012).

99. See, e.g., Shepard's Point Land Co. v. Atlantic Hotel, 132 N.C. 517, 534, 44 S.E. 39,
44 (1903), overruled in partby Gwathmey, 342 N.C. at 302, 464 S.E.2d at 683.
100. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-45.1 (2011); State ex rel. Rohrer v. Credle, 322 N.C. 522,
534, 369 S.E.2d 825, 832 (1988).
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restricted in its application due to a narrow definition of navigable
waterways."o' This duality-more strongly protecting resources that
traditionally fall under the public trust doctrine, while also limiting
the inclusion of non-traditional resources-likely reflects the high
premium North Carolina places on the existence and maintenance of
its water and coastal resources.102 This prioritization is evident in the
North Carolina Constitution, which reiterates the state's public trust
doctrine.103 While it sets forth that it is "the policy of this State to
conserve and protect its lands and waters for the benefit of all its
citizenry," the preservation of other resources-such as air and
forests-is subsequently listed as "a proper function of the State" as a
means to accomplish the prioritized protection of "its lands and
waters."'" Thus, although the focus of the State's public trust doctrine
on navigable waters and submerged lands could be interpreted as
effectively excluding all other resources from such protection,'0 5 it
ensures that the resources it does encompass enjoy the benefit of
stricter and more extensive protection.
II. THE ATMOSPHERIC TRUST

As discussed above, the public trust doctrine has experienced
varied application and expansion throughout the United States since
its adoption in the 1800s. Its common law roots and inconsistent and
evolving nature has left it open to both critical attacks and new
attempts at expansion. One of the most notable debates over the
future of the doctrine began in 2007, when Professor Mary Wood
began publishing what would become a wealth of scholarship
proposing to incorporate protection of the atmosphere into the public
101. See supranotes 90-92 and accompanying text.
102. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 113A-129.1 (2011) ("It is hereby determined and declared
as a matter of legislative finding that the coastal area of North Carolina contains a number
of important undeveloped natural areas. These areas are vital to continued fishery and
wildlife protection, water quality maintenance and improvement, preservation of unique
and important coastal natural areas, aesthetic enjoyment, and public trust rights such as
hunting, fishing, navigation, and recreation.... Important public purposes will be served
by the preservation of certain of these areas in an undeveloped state. Such areas would
thereafter be available for research, education, and other consistent public uses. These
areas would also continue to contribute perpetually to the natural productivity and
biological, economic, and aesthetic values of North Carolina's coastal area.").
103. See N.C. CONST. art. XIV, § 5; see also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 77-20(d) (2011)
(referencing the public trust doctrine as "a part of the common heritage of the State
recognized by Article XIV, Section 5 of the Constitution of North Carolina.").
104. N.C. CONST. art. XIV, § 5 (emphasis added).
105. However, it does not appear that expansion to protect additional resources has
ever been formally proposed and expressly rejected by the state.
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trust doctrine as a mechanism by which to address the climate crisis.'0 6
This proposal developed into the legal foundation for a coordinated
litigation effort challenging agency decision-making in courts across
the country, in an attempt to compel climate action at both the
federal and state level. While the theory has been dismissed by many
of the courts in which it has been advanced, it has experienced limited
success in others and will be re-evaluated by many more on appeal.
A.

Overview of the Atmospheric Trust Theory

The Atmospheric Trust theory argues that air should be treated
as a trust asset under the public trust doctrine, just as submerged
seabeds have been traditionally, and as other resources-like wildlife
and water quality-have been more recently. 07 The theory is founded
upon the premise that the amount of discretion that our modern
environmental regulatory regime grants to administrative agencies to
issue permits sanctioning pollution is flawed.' The Atmospheric
Trust seeks to reframe the debate over whether and how to deal with
greenhouse gas emissions by injecting into the conversation a sense of
legal-rather than moral or political-obligation for the government
to do so.' 09 The Atmospheric Trust would impose an affirmative duty
on legislatures to take action to mitigate climate change, requiring
public officials to shift from a bureaucratic mindset to the mindset of
a trustee who is obligated to "protect assets for present citizens and
future generations . ...

The viability of this theory rests upon, among other things, the
validity of classifying air as a trust asset under the public trust
doctrine."' Past expansions of the doctrine, and even its traditional
106. See, e.g., Wood IV, supra note 16, at 373-74. See generally Wood V, supra note 16.
For a full list of Professor Wood's publications, including those describing and developing
her Atmospheric Trust theory, see Mary Wood: Publications,UNIV. OF OR. SCH. OF LAW,
http://law.uoregon.edu/faculty/mwood/publications/ (last visited Nov. 15,2013).
107. See supra Part I.C.1.
108. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
109. See, e.g., Wood II, supra note 16, at 64 (calling for "a paradigm shift from political
discretion to fiduciary obligation in the management of natural resources").
110. See Wood III, supra note 16, at 130, 135, 139 ("At its core, the trust approach
rejects political solicitude towards private, singular interests and instead demands a
fiduciary duty of loyalty to the public to protect assets for present citizens and future
generations. Trust principles reframe what is currently government's discretion to destroy
our atmosphere and other resources into an obligation to defend those resources-as
commonly held assets in the Endowment we must hand down to our children for their
survival.").
111. See Wood I, supra note 13, at 113 ("As yet, there is no precedent declaring these
[public trust] principles in the context of the atmosphere .... "). But see M.C. Mehta v.
Kamal Nath, (1997) 1 S.C.C. 388, 413 (India) ("[The] [p]ublic at large is the beneficiary of
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manifestations, have been grounded in the conviction that "certain
interests are so particularly the gifts of nature's bounty that they
ought to be reserved for the whole of the populace"1 12 and that "some
resources are so central to the well-being of the community that they
must be protected by distinctive, judge-made principles."ll 3 Given
these sentiments, a valid argument can certainly be made in support
of the idea that the entire human population has a vested interest in
air quality and climate stability." 4 The global climate no doubt plays a
key role in every aspect of society, from public health to private
business endeavors. Civilization undoubtedly depends upon the
existence of air clean enough to breathe and weather predictable
enough to support agriculture. People use the stratosphere as a grand
highway for air transportation, and they rely on the mesosphere to
protect them from cosmic bombardment of meteors. As necessary as
water is to human civilization, air certainly must occupy at least the
same level of significance and importance to society." 5
B.

Atmospheric Trust Roles, Duties, and Obligations

The Atmospheric Trust theory is an extension of the public trust
doctrine that designates roles of the various interests at play
according to traditional trust law. The beneficiaries of the trust would
include current and future generations, encompassing all citizens
within the jurisdiction of the United States."' The legislature would

the sea-shore, running waters, airs, forests and ecologically fragile lands." (emphasis
added)); J. INST. at 2.1.1 ("Now the things which are, by natural law, common to all are
these: the air,running water, the sea and therefore the seashores." (emphasis added)).
112. Sax, supra note 14, at 484-85 (also stating that "certain uses have a peculiarly
public nature that makes their adaptation to private use inappropriate").
113. Charles F. Wilkinson, The Public Trust Doctrine in Public Land Law, 14 U.C.
DAvis L. REv. 269, 315 (1980).
114. See, e.g., Plaintiffs' Original Petition at 4, Bonser-Lain v. Tex. Comm'n on Envtl.
Quality, No. D-1-GN-11-002194, 2011 WL 8202306 (Tex. Dist. Ct. July 21,2011) (describing
plaintiffs as a group of "youth and young adults, who represent a living generation of
public trust beneficiaries who have a profound interest in ensuring that the climate
remains stable"). Professor Wood attempts to take this one step farther, extending the
concept to ecological stability more generally. See Wood II, supra note 16, at 84 ("A holistic
approach would recognize the people's interests in all resources sustaining ecological
balance-i.e., all natural resources." (footnote omitted)).
115. See Wood I, supra note 13, at 112.
116. See Wood II, supra note 16, at 67. Professor Wood also proposes further
expansion of this theory to a Global Atmospheric Trust, under which all current and
future generations around the world would be beneficiaries, with each nation as a
sovereign cotenant trustee. See id. at 87; Wood I, supra note 13, at 124-26; Wood III, supra
note 16, at 137-38; Wood IV, supra note 16, at 373, 376. Each country, as a trustee with
unity of possession over the atmospheric trust asset, would be charged with the duty not to
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serve as the trustee of the global atmosphere as a common asset, and
executive agencies would act as its agents, charged with implementing
its fiduciary trust duties.'17 Finally, the courts would serve as "the
ultimate guardian of the trust," charged with defining and enforcing
its obligations in furtherance of the best interest of its beneficiaries,
the public."'
The legislature (and administrative agencies), as trustee, would
be charged with the duty of undivided loyalty to the public."' Its most
basic fiduciary obligation would be to implement mechanisms to
reduce greenhouse gas emissions in order to maintain equilibrium of
the atmosphere.'20 In carrying out its trust obligations, the
government would be bound to act, first and foremost, in the best
interest of current and future generations. 2 ' Standard trust law
creates a fiduciary standard that could be applied to the government
and require it, as trustee of the atmosphere, to "do all acts necessary
for the preservation of the trust res which would be performed by a
reasonably prudent man employing his own like property for
purposes similar to those of the trust."' 22
In order to promote the interests of the beneficiaries, the
government would be charged with the traditional trust duty of
protection and the duty not to commit waste.'23 Although the trustee
would have the ability to allow some use and/or allocation of the trust
assets, it must pursue the course of action which, among statutory
alternatives, "is most protective of the assets."' 24 The people, as trust
beneficiaries, may enforce trust obligations against government

waste and would be liable to other nations for destroying or abusing the resource "so as to
destroy permanently its value . . .. " Wood II, supra note 16, at 84-87.
117. Wood III, supra note 16, at 93 (quoting Seminole Nation v. United States, 316
U.S. 286, 296-97 (1942)).
118. Id.
119. See id. at 93, 99-101.
120. The necessary reduction to maintain equilibrium-the concentration of
atmospheric greenhouse gases at which the climate would stabilize-would be determined
by scientific prescription, which would currently mandate a six percent decrease in global
emissions per year, starting in 2012. See Wood I, supra note 13, at 129.
121. Id. at 109; see also Wood II, supra note 16, at 69 ("[G]overnment trustees, who
serve at the will of the public, may not allocate rights to destroy what the people
legitimately own for themselves and for their posterity.").
122. Wood III, supra note 16, at 94 (footnote omitted).
123. See Wood II, supra note 16, at 77; Wood III, supra note 16, at 94-95; Wood IV,
supra note 16, at 376. The duty not to commit waste would apply to the trustee, as well as
sovereign cotenant trustees. See Wood III, supra note 16, at 95 ("Trustees and cotenants
alike have duties to protect the asset against waste.").
124. Wood III, supra note 16, at 104-05.
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trustees to protect the atmosphere from waste or unreasonable

impairment. 12 5
In general, the trust framework offers several principles that
anchor the duty of protection. For example, existing private rightssuch as licenses or permits-enabling individuals or companies to
pollute could be treated as subordinate to public rights, and the
government could revoke permits that conflict with the
trust.126Atmospheric Trust litigation draws its fiduciary standard from
a scientific prescription to restore equilibrium to the atmosphere by
reducing global carbon emissions by six percent annually. 127 The
government could implement this reduction through a variety of
regulations, for example through pricing mechanisms which would
internalize the environmental costs of pollution, 128 a carbon tax or a
cap and trade system, 29 or the redirection of energy subsidies from
fossil fuels to renewables.13 0 Government trustees would undoubtedly
have to decide what carbon emissions are most justified.'31
In addition to the duty of undivided loyalty and the duty of
protection, the government, as trustee, would be charged with the
duty to provide an accounting of carbon emissions.'32 Traditional trust
law would require the government to "disclose all matters pertaining
to the health of the trust, and [to] provide an accounting of the profits
and expenses to the trust."' 33 This disclosure would allow for
heightened transparency and enable better enforcement of the trust,
the management of which would be measured and evaluated
according to the health of the natural resources constituting the trust
assets, as determined by scientific experts. 34
Responsibility for enforcement of the Atmospheric Trust would
ultimately rest in the judicial branch.' 5 In this context, the current
125. See id. at 95.
126. Id. at 106-07.
127. Wood I, supra note 13, at 129. The government could phase out the most
egregious polluters first, perhaps through a moratorium on new coal-fired power plants.
See id. at 107; Wood IV, supra note 16, at 378.
128. See Wood III, supra note 16, at 110.
129. See Wood IV, supra note 16, at 378. For a cap and trade system initiated pursuant
to an Atmospheric Trust, the threshold-or cap-would have to be set no higher than the
total maximum use allowed to be "conveyed" under the public trust doctrine. See Coplan,
supra note 27, at 329.
130. See Wood III supra note 16, at 136; Wood IV, supra note 16, at 378.
131. See Wood III, supra note 16, at 110.
132. See id. at 94-98.
133. Id. at 101 (footnote omitted).
134. See id. at 95.
135. See Wood II, supranote 16, at 75.
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system of extensive judicial deference to agency decision-making3 6
would necessarily give way to a new standard, under which the
legislature and administrative agencies would be obliged to satisfy
their fiduciary obligations rather than having discretion to infringe
upon the terms of the trust.13 7 The traditional formulation of the
public trust doctrine suggests that courts could override government
decisions or actions that degrade the trust.' 8 Additionally, application
of the public trust doctrine would shift the burden of proof from the
complainant to the agency, "reversing the presumption of agency
regularity and expertise,""' and alleviating the difficulty citizens
otherwise face in demonstrating breach of the permissive "arbitrary
and capricious" standard.'4 0 The judicial remedy could take the form
of issuing declaratory judgments to require the legislature to
implement emissions reductions and granting injunctive relief to
enforce the fiduciary standard of care through a carbon accounting
and emissions reduction plan.14 '
C.

Atmospheric Trust Litigation

Our Children's Trust ("the organization"), an environmental
nonprofit organization based in Oregon, has built upon this
scholarship on the Atmospheric Trust.142 It has organized a
nationwide effort to bring suit in various federal and state courts,
challenging the government's failure to address the climate crisis as a
violation of its fiduciary duties under the public trust doctrine. 4 3 To
date, the organization has coordinated the filing of Atmospheric
Trust lawsuits in twelve state courts and in federal court." The
outcomes of these cases have generally been negative at the trial
136. See generally Chevron v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984)
(establishing the Chevron deference standard for agency interpretations); United States v.
Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218,226-27 (2001) (clarifying when Chevron deference applies).
137. See Wood II, supra note 16, at 76.
138. Id. at 75.
139. Lazarus, supra note 27, at 654.
140. See Sax, supra note 14, at 499; see also 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2012) (setting forth
the "arbitrary and capricious" standard of review for agency action).
141. See Wood II, supra note 16, at 144-46.
142. See About Us, OUR CHILDREN'S TRUST, http://ourchildrenstrust.org/about (last
visited Nov. 15, 2013).
143. See Legal Action, OUR CHILDREN'S TRUST, http://ourchildrenstrust.org/Legal
(last visited Nov. 15, 2013). Under the public trust doctrine, citizen beneficiaries have
standing to bring suit "against their governmental trustees for failing to protect their
natural trust." Wood I, supranote 13, at 132; see also Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 374, 381
(Cal. 1971) (stating private citizens have standing to sue the government under the public
trust doctrine).
144. See infra notes 147-80 and accompanying text.
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court stage, but many are still pending appeal, and some have shown
positive signs indicating potential for success on the merits.'45
1. Atmospheric Trust Litigation in Federal Court
In the spring of 2012, the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia considered the organization's federal lawsuit,
Alec L. v. Jackson,146 alleging the government's violation of its public
trust duty to protect the atmosphere for current and future
generations.'4 7 The plaintiffs' amended complaint asserted that the
atmosphere is "no different" from other resources subject to the
public trust doctrine and that "the United States government has an
affirmative fiduciary obligation to control atmospheric contamination
that has caused catastrophic and irreparable damage to our lands,
businesses, national security, and health."'4 8
In May 2012, the court granted the defendants' motion to
dismiss, with prejudice, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and
failure to state a claim.'49 This ruling was based on the court's review
of precedent establishing that the public trust doctrine is strictly a
matter of state law, therefore precluding federal jurisdiction."5 o The
court additionally reasoned that even if there were a federal public
trust doctrine, its application to the atmosphere would be precluded
by federal regulation of air pollution under the Clean Air Act.'"' In its
dismissal of the case, the court expressed optimism that the parties
would nevertheless be able to work together to solve the climate
crisis: "All of the parties seem to agree that protecting and preserving
the environment is a more than laudable goal, and the Court urges
everyone involved to seek (and perhaps even seize) as much common
ground as courage, goodwill and wisdom might allow to be
discovered."152

145. See infra Part II.C.2.
146. 863 F. Supp. 2d 11 (D.D.C. 2012), motion to reconsider denied, 2013 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 72301 (D.D.C. May 22, 2013).
147. The case was originally filed in the Northern District of California, but the court
granted defendants' motion to transfer venue. See Alec L. v. Jackson, No. C-11-2203
EMC, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 140102 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 6, 2011).
148. First Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 1, Alec L. v.
Jackson, 863 F. Supp. 2d 11 (D.D.C. 2012) (No. C11-02203).
149. See Alec L., 863 F. Supp. 2d at 12-13.
150. See id. at 15.
151. Id. at 15-16.
152. Id. at 17.
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2. Atmospheric Trust Litigation in State Courts
The majority of Atmospheric Trust lawsuits filed in state courts
have met similar fates as Alec L." So far, district courts have granted
state defendants' motions to dismiss with prejudice in Alaska,154
Arizona,"' Colorado,156 Minnesota,' Oregon,"' and Washington.15 9
A lawsuit filed in Montana was dismissed upon denial of plaintiffs'

153. In addition to the cases discussed in this section, lawsuits have also been filed in
California and Kansas, although these have not yet progressed to a disposition. See
Petition for Declaratory Judgment, for Writ of Mandamus and Application for Injunctive
Relief, Farb v. Brownback, No. 12C-001133 (Kan. Dist. Ct. filed Oct. 18, 2012), available at
http://ourchildrenstrust.org/sites/default/files/KansasFiledPetition.pdf; Complaint, Blades
v. State, No. CGC-11-510725 (Cal. Super. Ct. May 4, 2011), available at http://www
.eenews.net/assets/2011/05/05/documentgw_04.pdf. The Farb case was dismissed without
prejudice because the plaintiff needed first to petition the Kansas Department of Health
and Environment before seeking relief in the courts. See Press Release, Our Children's
Trust, Kansas Teenager Pledges to Petition Department of Health and Environment for
Climate Change Regulations After Court Tells Her to Go to Agency (June 13, 2013),
at
http://ourchildrenstrust.org/sites/default/files/2013.06.13-KansasPR.pdf.
available
Plaintiffs in the Blades case agreed to a voluntary dismissal of the case without prejudice,
with intent to re-file at a later date. See California Legal Updates, OUR CHILDREN'S
TRUST, http://www.ourchildrenstrust.org/state/california (last visited Nov. 15,2013).
154. Davis v. Alaska Dep't of Natural Res., No. 3AN-11-07474CI (Alaska Super. Ct.
March 2012). Plaintiffs appealed to the Alaska Supreme Court, and oral argument was
heard on October 3, 2013. See Atmospheric Trust Oral Arguments Heard Before Alaska
Supreme Court, OUR CHILDREN'S TRUST, http://ourchildrenstrust.org/event/524
/atmospheric-trust-oral-arguments-heard-alaska-supreme-court (last visited Nov. 15, 2013).
155. Peshlakai v. Brewer, No. CV2011-010106 (Ariz. Dist. Ct. Feb. 10, 2012), available at
http://www.arnoldporter.com/resources/documents/Peshlakai.pdf. The court of appeals
upheld the district court's decision on state constitutional grounds, declining to make a
finding as to whether or not the doctrine could be expanded to protect the atmosphere.
See Butler v. Brewer, No. 1 CA-CV 12-0347, 2013 Ariz. App. Unpub. LEXIS 272, at
*24 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2013).
156. Martinez v. State, No. 2011CV-004377 (Colo. Dist. Ct. Nov. 7, 2011), available at
http://www.mountainstateslegal.org/news-updates/case-documents/2011/11/07/order-redefendants-and-intervenor-s-motions-to-dismiss#.Uhd2a2SIBu9.
157. Aronow v. Dayton, No. 62-CV-11-3952 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Jan. 30, 2012), available at
http://climatelawyers.com/file.axd?file=2012%2F2%2F20120130+Order+of+Dismissal%2
C+Aronow+v.+Minnesota+(Our+Children's+Trust).pdf.
158. Chernaik v. Kitzhaber, No. 16-11-09273 (Or. Cir. Ct. April 5, 2012), available at
http://www.arnoldporter.com/resources/documents/Chernaik.pdf.
159. Svitak v. State, No. 11-2-16008-4 (Wash. Super. Ct. Mar. 2, 2012), available at
http://www.arnoldporter.com/resources/documents/Svitak.pdf. The Washington Supreme
Court denied plaintiffs' petition for direct review. See Appellate Court Case Summary,
WASHINGTON COURTS, http://dw.courts.wa.gov/index.cfm?fa=home.casesummary&crt-itl

nu=A08&casenumber=871981&searchtype=aName&token=4A15C689A3BO8DAF102B
27F1CBDD8EB6&dt=69CDECAA06BE8976DE4DO6F4F70781F2&courtClassCode=A
(last visited Nov. 15, 2013)
&casekey=158897420&courtname=Supreme%20Court
(showing the Order Terminating Review as being filed on December 4, 2012). The case is
now pending appeal before the Washington Court of Appeals, Division I. Id.
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petition for original jurisdiction in the Montana Supreme Court.o60
Lawsuits filed in New Mexicol6 and Iowal62 were allowed to proceed
to the merits, but the end result was the same. Although the New
Mexico case survived the defendant's motion to dismiss,163 the district
court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment.M In
Iowa, the trial court declined to expand the state's public trust
doctrine to include the atmosphere, and the Iowa Court of Appeals
affirmed.165
However, the New Mexico and Iowa cases appear to suggest that
adopting the Atmospheric Trust would not be out of the question in
different circumstances. Judge Singleton of the New Mexico trial
court indicated that it might be appropriate to expand the doctrine if
the political branches completely abdicated their responsibility to
consider the atmosphere in enacting environmental protections.166
She granted defendant's motion for summary judgment because of
160. Order, Barhaugh v. State, No. OP 11-0258 (Mont. June 15, 2011), available at
http://edberry.com/SiteDocs/PDF/CPI/Order-Final-DispositionDenypdf.
161. Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Sanders-Reed v.
Martinez, No. D-101-CV-2011-01514 (N.M. Dist. Ct. May 4, 2011), available at
http://www.eenews.net/assets/2012/06/29/document-pm_- 02.pdf.
162. Petition for Judicial Review, Filippone v. Iowa Dep't of Natural Res., No. 05771CV-008748 (Iowa Dist. Ct. Jan. 30, 2012), available at http://www.ourchildrenstrust.org
/sites/default/files/IA%20Complaint.pdf.
163. See Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Defendants' Motion to Dismiss
Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint, Sanders-Reed, No. D-101-CV-2011-01514 (N.M. Dist. Ct.
July 14, 2012), available at http://ourchildrenstrust.org/sites/default/files/Order
%20Denying%20Motion%20to%20Dismiss.pdf ("Plaintiffs have made a substantive
allegation that, notwithstanding statutes enacted by the New Mexico Legislature which
enable the state to set state air quality standards, the process has gone astray and the state
is ignoring the atmosphere with respect to greenhouse gas emissions.").
164. See Order Granting Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and Denying
Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment, Sanders-Reed, No. D-101-CV-2011-01514
(N.M. Dist. Ct. July 4, 2013), available at http://climatelawyers.com/file.axd
?file=2013%2f8%2f20130704+Order+on+Summary+Judgment+(Sanders-Reed+v.+Mart
inez).pdf. Plaintiffs filed a notice of appeal to the New Mexico Court of Appeals or
Supreme Court on July 24, 2013. Case Lookup, NEW MEXICO COURTS, https://caselookup
.nmcourts.gov/caselookup/app (last visited Nov. 15, 2013) (select case number search from
tab menu, enter D-101-CV-201101514, click search).
165. See Filippone v. Iowa Dep't of Natural Res., No. 12-0444, 2013 Iowa App. LEXIS
279, at *7 (Iowa Ct. App. 2013) (citing lack of precedent to expand public trust doctrine);
Iowa Legal Updates, OUR CHILDREN'S TRUST, http://www.ourchildrenstrust.org
/state/Iowa (last visited Nov. 15, 2013) (discussing the district court's holding).
166. See Order Granting Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and Denying
Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment, Sanders-Reed, No. D-101-CV-2011-01514, at
Ex. A, 1 ("I think that in applying this Doctrine, ... the Supreme Court [of New Mexico]
would allow the judicial branch to bypass the political process if there was an indication
that the political process had gone astray, that they had ignored what they were supposed
to do, or if the agency was not attempting to apply the statutory scheme, or if the public
was excluded from the process.").
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this hesitancy to disrupt the state's separation of powers. 67 Judge
Doyle, concurring in the Iowa Court of Appeals decision, echoed
similar sentiments: "I agree there is no Iowa case law for extending
the public trust doctrine to include the atmosphere. But, I believe
there is a sound public policy basis for doing so."168 Ultimately, both
judges agreed that there was insufficient precedent to support such an
expansion of the doctrine without compelling evidence that the
political process was incapable of addressing the problem.'6 9
One positive reaction of a state court to these Atmospheric Trust
legal efforts occurred in July 2012, in a Texas state district court.17 0
The plaintiffs, a group of "youth and young adults, who represent a
living generation of public trust beneficiaries,""' brought suit to
challenge the state environmental regulatory agency's denial of their
petition for promulgation of regulations to reduce and track carbon
dioxide emissions. In a letter ruling, Judge Triana held that the
public trust doctrine is not "exclusively limited to the conservation of
the State's waters" and that it instead "includes all natural resources
of the State."l73 The letter ruling also held that the state agency is not
precluded from enacting more stringent air quality requirements than
those mandated by the federal Clean Air Act.'74 This case,
characterized as "a 'shot heard 'round the world' in climate change
167. Id. at 4 ("I believe that what we are really talking about, at bottom, are political
differences, and that the real remedy is to elect people who believe that greenhouse gases
are a problem, that man does contribute to climate change, and that those are the people
who should be making policy decisions. But that's a political decision, not a Court
decision.").
168. Filippone, 2013 Iowa App. LEXIS 279, at *9 (Doyle, J., concurring).
169. Id. at *10 ("[I1n view of our supreme court's stated reluctance to extend the public
trust doctrine beyond the rivers, lakes, and the lands adjacent thereto, I do not feel it is
appropriate for a three-judge panel of this court to take on the task of expanding the
doctrine to include air."); Order Granting Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment
and Denying Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment, Sanders-Reed, No. D-101-CV2011-01514, at Ex. A, 1 ("I have to say it's not an easy fit, because many of the cases with
the Public Trust Doctrine arose in the context of water. And it's not easy, always easy to
translate water or ownership of streams or stream beds to something like what to do about
greenhouse gas emissions.").
170. Bonser-Lain v. Tex. Comm'n on Envtl. Quality, No. D-1-GN-11-002194, slip op. at 1
(Tex. Dist. Ct. Aug. 2, 2012), available at http://ourchildrenstrust.org/sites
/default/files/TexasFinalJudgment.pdf.
171. Plaintiffs' Original Petition at 4, Bonser-Lain, No. D-1-GN-11-002194, available at
http://www.law.uh.edu/faculty/thester/courses/Climate-Change2012/BonserLain%20v%20TCEQ.pdf.
172. Id. at 1.
173. Bonser-Lain,No. D-1-GN-11-002194, slip op. at 1.
174. See id. at 2 (stating that "the FCAA requirement is a floor, not a ceiling, for the
protection of air quality").
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litigation,"" represents the first instance in which a contemporary
court has expressly held that the atmosphere is a resource properly
protected under the public trust doctrine.
Despite this seemingly expansive holding, the outcome of this
case does not necessarily foreshadow the ultimate success of the
Atmospheric Trust litigation effort. First and foremost, despite the
judge's conclusion that the atmosphere is a trust resource under the
public trust doctrine, the order did not direct the agency to regulate
carbon dioxide emissions. 17 6 Instead, Judge Triana held that the
agency's decision to deny the petition for rulemaking was "a
reasonable exercise of [its] discretion" due to ongoing litigation over
the relationship between state and federal regulation of greenhouse
gases."' Second, the letter ruling notes that protection of air quality is
not mandated solely by the public trust doctrine as a matter of
common law, but also by the state constitution's express
incorporation of the doctrine's principles."' Therefore, it is unclear
whether the judge would have reached the same conclusion in the
absence of such constitutional authority. And lastly, the precedential
value of the court's holding is limited by the threat of being
overturned on appeal.'79
III. THEORETICAL FEASIBILITY AND PRACTICAL CONCERNS

The Atmospheric Trust proposal is indeed a creative and
compelling legal theory, intended as a relatively simple, yet
comprehensive, solution to the climate crisis society has so far failed
to address. Amidst a broken system of piecemeal and incremental
environmental laws, the Atmospheric Trust would operate as a
175. Press Release, Our Children's Trust, Alaska Youth Pursue Climate Case 1 (Nov. 16,
2012), available at http://ourchildrenstrust.org/sites/default/files/12-11-16%20AK%20Press
%20Release%20.pdf.
176. Bonser-Lain,No. D-1-GN-11-002194, slip op. at 3.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 1-2. The letter ruling quotes the following provision of the Texas
Constitution: "The conservation and development of all of the natural resources of this
State, ... and the preservation and conservation of all such natural resources of the State
are each and all hereby declared public rights and duties; and the Legislature shall pass all
such laws as may be appropriate thereto." Id. (citing TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 59).
179. See Notice of Appeal, Bonser-Lain v. Tex. Comm'n on Envtl. Quality, No. D-1-GN11-002194 (Tex. Dist. Aug. 23, 2012). The Third Court of Appeals of Texas held oral
argument in the case on September 25,2013. See Notice for Submission on Oral Argument,
Bonser-Lain v. Tex. Comm'n on Envtl. Quality, No. 03-12-00555-CV (Tex. App. Aug. 5
2013), available at http://www.search.txcourts.gov/SearchMedia.aspx?MediaVersionlD
=1a501fb5-a269-42e8-bl4f-6bl09e7dl7d9&coa=coa03&DT=SUBMISSION/OA&Media
ID=ee78f839-5fcd-4dca-a153-5f597a100444.
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macro-level approach to solving a macro-level problem.so However,
the theory faces numerous theoretical and practical obstacles which it
must address if it is to succeed in state court litigation outside of
Texas (or on appeal in Texas, for that matter). Many of the
theoretical concerns raised will be common to all states; many of the
practical concerns, however, will be tied to the particular jurisdiction
in which the Atmospheric Trust is proposed.'
A.

Theoretical Concerns

One of the primary theoretical concerns arising from the
Atmospheric Trust proposal is its potential to dilute the public trust
doctrine itself, thereby weakening its power and import as an
independent legal doctrine, distinct from the state's general police
power.182 This distinction is important for three reasons. First, there is
an important difference in the extent of discretion granted to the
government in deciding whether and how to regulate. Whereas the
police power grants government the general authority to regulate, the
public trust doctrine imposes a stricter obligationto do so.183
Second, the two sources of authority address different public
concerns and thus regulate private conduct in different ways. Exercise
of the police power has historically been limited to protecting public
health and safety, M appearing predominantly in the form of
regulation enacted in response to the development of new or
threatened danger. In contrast, the public trust doctrine requires the
government to prevent degradation to the trust assets,' which
generally necessitates proactive regulation to guard against such
damage occurring in the first place. Furthermore, the police power
historically has been more concerned with protection of individual

180. See Wood I, supra note 13, at 126.
181. For discussion of these state-specific concerns as they apply to North Carolina, see
infra Section Il.B.
182. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
183. See Wood I, supra note 13, at 108 (describing the public trust doctrine as "a
property-based counterweight to discretionary police power"); Wood II, supra note 16, at
65 (describing the public trust doctrine as "property-based obligations of the sovereign");
Sax, supra note 12, at 478 (describing the public trust doctrine as a "special, and more
demanding, obligation" than the police power).
184. See Wood II, supra note 16, at 65 (describing the police power as a "legislative
authority and obligation to protect public health and welfare"); Lazarus, supra note 27, at
667 (describing scope of police power as limited to "narrow health and safety concerns,"
such as protecting private property and providing security from domestic crime and
foreign invasion).
185. See supra Part I.
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interests, while the public trust doctrine is entirely focused on
protection of public interests.18 6
Third, and perhaps most important, courts review government
action pursuant to each source of authority using different standards.
At its core, the role of the police power is to protect the exercise and
enjoyment of individuals' private rights to the extent they do not
interfere with the private rights of others-essentially an authority to
Courts evaluate government
enforce public nuisance law.'
regulation pursuant to the police power using a broad balancing test
between the governmental interest and private expectations
involved.' Such regulation is generally upheld if found to be
"reasonable[]" 18 9 and based on a "common good"' 90 or "public
welfare"' 9' justification. By contrast, the balancing test under the
public trust doctrine is much more limited, and courts will review
governmental action (or inaction) in the public trust context with a
higher level of scrutiny. 192
The confusion between these two forms of governmental
authority has plagued public trust jurisprudence since Illinois
Central.1 93 As a result, the contemporary public trust doctrine is at
risk of blurring into a police power, therefore losing its teeth and
providing less and less protection for the resources within its scope.
This is tantamount to "tak[ing] a rigorous legal principle and
squeez[ing] it to death."19' For states like North Carolina that have
maintained a limited public trust doctrine in order to provide special
186. See Barnett, supra note 66, at 493 ("[P]roperly construed, the protection of
individual rights is at the core of a state's police power."); Lazarus, supra note 27, at 636
(noting the contrast between jus publicum and jus regium and characterizing the police
power as the protection of private property expectations).
187. See Barnett,supra note 66, at 479, 483-84.
188. See Lazarus, supra note 27, at 666.
189. Barnett, supra note 66, at 491.
190. Id. at 483, 487.
191. Id. at 488, 491.
192. See supra notes 139-41 and accompanying text (describing reversal of
presumption in favor of government in context of public trust doctrine cases); see also
Lazarus, supra note 27, at 666 (describing the standard as an application of "formalistic
categories of property law" rather than as a balancing test).
193. See supra notes 65-67 and accompanying text; see also Lazarus, supra note 27, at
713 ("[T]he [Supreme] Court has plainly forecast its view that the public trust doctrine
expresses no more than the sovereign's special interest in an aspect of its general police
power authority."); Sax, supra note 14, at 478 ("Confusion has arisen from the failure of
many courts to distinguish between the government's general obligation to act for the
public benefit, and the special, and more demanding, obligation which it may have as a
trustee of certain public resources.").
194. Sax, supra note 14, at 553.
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protection for water and coastal resources, an attempt at such
expansion could be the downfall of the doctrine altogether. The value
of the public trust doctrine in such states lies in its operation as "a
trump in the political game," separating the resources which the state
considers to be most important to the public interest from the
"multitude of competing interests in the give and take of the state
legislatures," and affording them heightened protection from private
interests.195 Once the doctrine is expanded to protect more and more
natural resources, however, this "trump" loses its value, as many
resources would rise to the same level of significance. The resources
that the doctrine traditionally protected could be left fully exposed to
the tides of political discretion, alongside other natural resources,
leaving them all to be managed essentially through the state's police
power. 196
Expanding the public trust doctrine to incorporate the
atmosphere as a trust asset could be a significant step in creating this
overlap with the police power and further eroding the distinction
between the two. This may be especially true in jurisdictions where
the public trust doctrine operates only as a prohibition on alienation
of trust resources, rather than as an affirmative duty to protect and
restore those resources. 97 And given that the former is the majority
approach, the potential for additional confusion and dilution of the
doctrine is significant.
Another theoretical concern implicated by the Atmospheric
Trust proposal is an extension of a classic criticism of the public trust
doctrine itself: decisions regarding natural resources that are so
integral to the public interest should not be made solely by the
judiciary, the one branch of American government that is largely
unaccountable to the public and thus inherently anti-democratic.'1
195. Huffman, supra note 27, at 93.
196. See Lazarus, supra note 27, at 665 ("It is now well settled that the police power is
the most fundamental source of government authority to prevent needless environmental
harm and related risks to human health and welfare.").
197. See supra notes 68-73 and accompanying text; see also Huffman, supra note 27, at
96 ("The concept to which the rule of law is tethered would no longer be the public right
in navigation, commerce and fishing in navigable waters. It would be the public interest as
broadly conceived as anyone might imagine which is indistinguishable from the scope of
the police power.").
198. See J. Peter Byrne, The Public Trust Doctrine, Legislation, and Green Property:A
Future Convergence?, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 915, 927 (2012) ("[TJhe initiative also exposes
the public trust doctrine's greatest weakness: it simply claims too much.... [C]ourts
around the world would truly become the 'Platonic guardians' of society .... Such
authority would lack political legitimacy."); see also Huffman, supra note 27, at 100 ("In
modern public trust law a special interest can be converted to a public right by the stroke
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Moreover, given the importance of air and the atmosphere to modern
society-and ultimately to human civilization-would it really be wise
to hand over all management decisions affecting the atmosphere to
the discretion of unelected, generalist judges who are likely
unfamiliar with climate science; or are such important decisions
properly reserved to the legislatures, which are accountable to the
people, and executive agencies, which have the requisite expertise? 199
These classic questions of legal and political theory prove particularly
salient in this context.
A third theoretical concern arising from Atmospheric Trust
theory concerns the underlying purpose and spirit of the public trust
doctrine. Given the "unclear ancestry" of the current formulation of
the public trust doctrine, expanding it to also require protection of the
atmosphere is that much more tenuous as a matter of legal
precedent.2 00 From the beginning, the purpose of the doctrine has
been to promote commercial activity and economic growth.201
Protecting navigable waters under the doctrine was premised entirely
on their capacity to be used to conduct commerce and engage in other
economic activities such as fishing.202 The Atmospheric Trust
proposal, on the other hand, seeks the opposite end: its purpose is to
curb commercial and industrial use of the atmosphere in order to
of a sympathetic judge's pen. That right will then serve to preempt the claims of private
property owners and to trump the political process.... [T]he legislature speaks for the
public. It is the only legitimate voice for the public interest."); Sax, supra note 14, at 521
("The 'public trust' has no life of its own and no intrinsic content. It is no more-and no
less-than a name courts give to their concerns about the insufficiencies of the democratic
process."); Barton H.Thompson, The Public Trust Doctrine:A Conservative Reconstruction
& Defense, 15 SOUTHEASTERN ENVTL. L.J. 47, 54 (2006) (describing the public trust
doctrine as "anti-majoritarian-an effort by the judiciary to carve out an area of property
law where courts are superior to the democratic branches of government").
199. See Lazarus, supra note 27, at 712 ("[R]egardless of judicial bias or desire, courts
may lack sufficient competence in the environmental arena."); Sax, supra note 14, at 513
("[C]ourts are accustomed to dealing with the meaning of statutory and constitutional
language rather than with data which help to identify and compare the benefits and costs
at stake in the cases before them.").
200. See Thompson, supra note 198, at 56-57 ("There is no precedent, in particular, for
the extension of the public trust by some courts beyond tidal lands and navigable
waterways, nor for the proposition that the public trust doctrine limits development of
trust lands for economic purposes."); see also Huffman, supra note 27, at 103 ("[A] careful
review of the history-the precedent-does not make the case for expanded application of
the public trust doctrine.").
201. See generally Epstein, supra note 60 (explaining the broad beginnings of the public
trust doctrine as a method of protecting land and waterways in order to advance
commerce).
202. See supra Part I.B; see also Epstein, supra note 60, at 412, 416 (describing the
original function of applying the doctrine to navigable waters as limiting governmental
control over public resources).
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maintain stability of the climate. Especially given the tenuous
connection between the proposal for expansion and the doctrine's
historical precedent,203 courts may be reluctant to interpret the
doctrine in a way that undermines its foundational principles of
protecting navigable waters and promoting economic activity.
B.

PracticalConcerns in North Carolina

The Atmospheric Trust proposal raises a multitude of practical
concerns, many of which are outside the scope of this Comment.20 4
Some of the most pressing among them, however, are best illustrated
by using North Carolina as a hypothetical case study. The likelihood
of a North Carolina state court adopting the Atmospheric Trust is
uncertain at best, given the courts' previous interpretations of the
public trust doctrine 2 0' and the rising influence of special interests in
the selection process of the state judiciary.206 Much of the literature
developing the Atmospheric Trust relies in part on the argument that
the judiciary is best situated to make decisions in the public interest
because it is isolated from the political influences which plague the
other two branches of government.2 07

203. See supra notes 37-43 and accompanying text.
204. Among these outstanding questions are the following: (1) If the atmosphere is
incorporated into the public trust doctrine as a new trust asset, where would the line be
drawn? What other resources would then also need to be considered for incorporation?
Would every special interest start advocating for additional expansion of the doctrine? (2)
How would the public trust doctrine actually be implemented? Would all current permits
and other preexisting rights be rendered automatically void, or would some be
grandfathered in and/or slowly phased out? Who would decide where to draw the line of
how much air pollution would be allowed in order to strike a balance between economic
growth (beneficial uses) and climate stability? Would the courts actively oversee
management of the trust assets, or would they only intervene when someone with standing
to sue sought to enforce the trust against the government? See Sax, supra note 14, at 482
("However strongly one might feel about the present imbalance in resource allocation, it
hardly seems sensible to ask for a freezing of any future specific configuration of policy
judgments, for that result would seriously hamper the government's attempts to cope with
the problems caused by changes in the needs and desires of the citizenry.").
205. See supra notes 85-101 and accompanying text.
206. See infra notes 208-11 and accompanying text.
207. See, e.g., Wood I, supra note 13, at 105; Wood III, supra note 16, at 111; see also
Corinna Barrett Lain, The Unexceptionalism of "Evolving Standards," 57 UCLA L. REV.
365, 417 (2009) ("The whole point of having an unelected judiciary is its ability to serve as
a check on majority rule, which is why the Supreme Court's countermajoritarian capacity
undergirds most every normative theory of judicial review."). This Comment does not
attempt to answer whether or not this assumption is correct-largely because the
argument is less applicable when considered in the context of North Carolina, a state that
rejects the model of judicial appointment by subjecting all of its state court judges to the
will of the general electorate. See N.C. CONST. art. IV, § 16.
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However, in a state like North Carolina, where the judiciary is
elected rather than appointed, its presumed distinction from the other
two branches of government on the basis of potential political
influence is questionable. Although officially nonpartisan, the courts
are subject to similar political pressures as other elected officials who
may feel indebted to major campaign donors.208 Indeed, the winner of
the 2012 North Carolina Supreme Court election was backed by the
N.C. Judicial Coalition, a "conservative leaning" political action
committee (PAC),209 which spent $1.94 million on television
advertisements in support of the incumbent candidate. 21 0 Thus, in
North Carolina, special interest lobbies have the opportunity to
permeate through every branch of government.21 ' The fossil fuel
lobby and other industry proponents could conceivably influence an
elected judge's interpretation of the public trust doctrine just as they

208. See, e.g., Richard Briffault, Reforming Campaign Finance Reform: A Review of
Voting with Dollars, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 643, 646 (2003) ("Private funding may potentially
distort government decision making. When candidates depend on private donations, large
donors and prospective donors may obtain special access, and their views and concerns
may be given extra weight. This may involve not outright vote buying, but more subtle
opportunities to participate more extensively and more effectively in influencing official
actions. The Supreme Court has referred to this as 'the actuality and appearance of
corruption resulting from large individual financial contributions.' " (quoting Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 26 (1976)).
209. North
Carolina Judicial Coalition, FOLLOwNCMONEY,
http://www
.followncmoney.org/committee/north-carolina-judicial-coalition?order=fielddateexpend
iturevalue&sort=asc (last updated Jan. 24, 2013). An examination of the PAC's
contributions reveals the following entries from official Republican organizations: $50,000
from the North Carolina Republican Party; $500 from the Forsyth County Republican
Party; $1,000 from the NC Federation of Republican Women; $500 from the Henderson
County Republican Womens [sic] Club; $5,000 from Charlotte Mecklenburg Republican
Women; $500 from the Mountain High Republican Woman's Association; and $1,000
from-the Union County Republican Party. See id. The PAC's largest donor, contributing
$1.48 million, was a PAC itself-Justice for All N.C.-with its own "ties to Republicans."
Mark Binker, New Ad Hits Ervin in State Supreme Court Race, WRAL NEWS (Nov. 2,
2012), http://www.wral.com/new-ad-hits-ervin-in-state-supreme-court-race/11731009/. The
N.C. Judicial Coalition was run by Tom Fetzer, former Chairman of the North Carolina
Republican Party. See id.
210. See FOLLOwNCMONEY, supra note 209. The PAC spent $1.3 million on the
infamous "banjo ad" alone. Craig Jarvis, Super PAC Spends $1.3 Million on Supreme
Court Candidate, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER (Oct. 30, 2012), http://www.charlotteobserver
.com/2012/10/29/3630538/super-pac-spends-13-million-on.html.
211. See L. Jay Jackson, Legislators and Special Interests are Making Sure We Get the
State Court Judges They Want, A.B.A. J., July 2013, at 56 (describing how corporate
interests are expanding lobbying efforts to the judiciary); see also N.C. Public Campaign
Fund, N.C. CTR. FOR VOTER EDUC., http://ncvotered.com/judges/ (last visited Nov. 15,
2013) ("An overwhelming 94 percent of North Carolina voters believe campaign
contributions can sway a judge's ruling, according to a 2011 poll from the nonpartisan N.C.
Center for Voter Education.").
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can influence a legislator's vote on climate legislation.2 12 Furthermore,
such influence is more likely to go unnoticed by the public, since it
can be masked through reference to some legal precedent-especially
in cases deciding issues of law which are not settled or well-defined
and thus open to interpretation. 213 Thus, the success or failure of the
Atmospheric Trust proposal in a North Carolina state court may
ultimately rest on the particular judges' personal convictions or
connections to special interests, which could influence their
willingness to interpret the public trust doctrine so expansively.214
Even if North Carolina state judges were to adopt the
Atmospheric Trust theory into the state's public trust doctrine, the
question then becomes: Would the state legislature let the decision
stand?2 15 Recent actions taken by the North Carolina General
Assembly suggest the answer would be a resounding "no." The state
legislature has clearly demonstrated its opposition to climate change
legislation,21 an indicator that it may be willing to take corrective
212. See, e.g., Sara Burrows, Climate Change Commission Gets Cold Shoulder,
CAROLINA
J.
ONLINE
(Aug.
4,
2010),
http://www.carolinajournal.com
/exclusives/display-exclusive.html?id=6679 (noting the role of "the energy, manufacturing,
forestry, agricultural and auto industries" in blocking passage of climate legislation in
North Carolina); Sue Sturgis, The Big Money Behind the Assault Against Sea Level Rise
Science in North Carolina, INST. FOR S. STUDIES (July 11, 2012, 12:47 AM),
http://www.southernstudies.org/2012/07/the-big-money-behind-the-assault-against-sealevel-rise-science-in-north-carolina.html (describing the influence of the real estate and
home builders' lobbies over the passage of legislation banning the use of sea level rise data
until 2016).
213. See Sax, supra note 12, at 553 ("Perhaps the most striking impression produced by
a review of public trust cases in various jurisdictions is the sense of openness which the law
provides; there is generally support for whatever decision a court might wish to adopt."
(emphasis added)); see also Lazarus, supra note 27, at 712 ("In the past, courts have used
the public trust doctrine to support developmental activities they favored.").
214. See Byrne, supra note 198, at 919 ("[RJeliance on judges could backfire-their
perceived solicitude for the environment could change to solicitude for individual property
rights."); Lazarus, supra note 27, at 710 ("[T]he doctrine unjustifiably relies on the
judiciary to further its environmental goals and, consequently, ultimately depends on a
proenvironment judicial bias that is not enduring."); Sax, supra note 14, at 558 ("It should
be obvious that courts operate with an extraordinary degree of freedom and that the
procedural devices they employ are very significantly determined by their attitudes about
the propriety of the policies which are before them.").
215. Under Gwathmey, the North Carolina General Assembly retains the authority to
alter the state's interpretation and application of the public trust doctrine, subject only to
the confines of the state constitution. Gwathmey v. Dep't of Env't, Health & Natural Res.,
342 N.C. 287, 304, 464 S.E.2d 674, 684 (1995). While the common law doctrine creates a
presumption of protection of trust resources, the legislature can overcome this
presumption by express legislative grant. See id.
216. For example, in 2010 the General Assembly refused to implement the majority of
recommendations and legislative proposals offered in the final report of its Legislative
Commission on Global Climate Change. See Burrows, supra note 212 (additionally noting
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action if the courts were to encroach upon this policy decision by
adopting the Atmospheric Trust. Indeed, the General Assembly is so
opposed to taking action on climate change that it passed legislation
banning regulatory use of the state's Coastal Resources Commission's
scientific data and predictions relating to the rate of sea level rise
until July 2016.217 Ironically, the bill was passed just after the United
States Geological Survey published a report warning that sea level
rise is happening three to four times faster along an east coast
"hotspot"-from the southern tip of North Carolina to
Massachusetts-than it is globally. 218 Instead of using this report to
begin a conversation about how to best protect North Carolina
coastal communities from increased storm surges and more frequent
flooding, the state legislature opted to look the other way and ignore
the science behind the warning.219
If the legislature is so opposed to taking action on climate change
that it would publicly denounce mainstream science just to avoid
addressing sea level rise, there is little room for hope that it would
ever allow an unlikely judicial decision expanding the state's public
trust doctrine in the name of climate stability to stand. Indeed, this
appears so obvious that it could conceivably prevent a state court
from adopting such an interpretation in the first place, for fear of
being overridden by corrective legislation.220

that "[tihe two proposals [out of forty-two] that did become law only commissioned more
studies").
, _; Patrick
217. See Act of July 3, 2012, ch. 202, § 2(a), 2012 N.C. Sess. Laws
Gannon, Sea-level Rise Bill Becomes Law, STARNEWS ONLINE (Aug. 1, 2012, 4:49 PM),
http://www.starnewsonline.com/article/20120801/ARTICLES/120809970?p=1&tc=pg;
Alon Harish, New Law in North CarolinaBans Latest Scientific Predictions of Sea Level
Rise, ABC NEWS (Aug. 2, 2012), http://abcnews.go.com/US/north-carolina-bans-latestscience-rising-sea-level/story?id=16913782.
218. Press Release, U.S. Geological Survey, Sea Level Rise Accelerating in U.S.
Atlantic Coast (June 24, 2012, 1:00 PM), http://www.usgs.gov/newsroom/article
.asp?ID=3256&from=rsshome#.T_9TFStYu5M. This has serious consequences for North
Carolina coastal communities, as "[o]ngoing accelerated sea level rise in the hotspot will
make coastal cities and surrounding areas increasingly vulnerable to flooding by adding to
the height that storm surge and breaking waves reach on the coast." Id.
219. Ironically, this legislation will inhibit the state's ability to effectively protect and
preserve one of the only resources it affirmatively incorporates into its public trust
doctrine, the shoreline.
220. See Sax, supra note 14, at 559 ("[E]ven those courts which are the most active and
interventionist in the public trust area are not interested in displacing legislative bodies as
the final authorities in setting resource policies.").
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The Problem of State Patchworks

Although the Atmospheric Trust proposal is creative and
compelling, it faces serious practical hurdles in a state like North
Carolina. This does not mean that it will not work elsewhere, but it
does raise a fundamental concern about its overall viability: if every
state has its own approach to the public trust doctrine, and each can
choose to adopt or reject the Atmospheric Trust proposal, how would
this patchwork fit together to solve such a universal-indeed
international-pollution problem?
The Atmospheric Trust litigation may succeed in a handful of
states whose judges are already inclined to interpret the doctrine
expansively, creating pockets of Atmospheric Trusts across the
country. Each of these doctrines would develop independently,
leading to inconsistent definitions and implementation. This
inevitably would lead to conflict between states that have adopted the
approach and those that have not, and possibly even between states
that have adopted the Atmospheric Trust but have implemented it
differently. Under such a scenario, some states will have no legal
obligation to rein in greenhouse gas pollution, and the states which do
will be unable to control or influence those who do not or even those
who have different ways of doing so. Due to the inherently transboundary nature of air, the trust asset as defined by one state will
inevitably be used and degraded by its neighbors. While this is a
common criticism of most efforts to address climate change-and can
usually be easily disposed of with the response that incremental
progress is better than none-it raises additional concerns in the
context of the public trust doctrine. How could citizens in an
Atmospheric Trust jurisdiction enforce the terms of the trust-i.e.,
prove the State has failed to meet its duty to protect the atmosphere
from unreasonable greenhouse gas emissions-when the failure is
really that of neighboring states who are not so obliged to protect
it?221 Would the government be required to address interstate
pollution as part of its obligation to protect the atmosphere for its

citizens? 222
221. See Brown, supra note 21, at 446-47 ("[G]iven the tremendous range of
interpretations the states have given to the public trust, the doctrine could form the basis
of a challenge to damaging practices in one state but not another .... Whether the public
trust doctrine can provide a remedy for citizens opposing climate change is definitely a
question of geography and jurisdiction.").
222. Professor Wood argues that neighboring states would operate as sovereign cotenants of the Atmospheric Trust, thus incurring additional fiduciary duties owed to one
another. See Wood II, supra note 16, at 86-87. Under such a theory, states would be liable
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Professor Wood suggests that the Atmospheric Trust, as a
macro-level approach, would create a liability structure that states
cannot simply opt out of once established.223 Successful litigation in
states which are predisposed to adopt the proposal could conceivably
have an indirect ripple effect on those which are not. One of the goals
of the Atmospheric Trust proposal is to encourage a fundamental
shift in how society thinks about the role of government in
maintaining the integrity of the global environment. State-based
litigation could conceivably find limited success by creating pockets of
Atmospheric Trusts throughout the country. Theoretically, if enough
states adopt the expanded doctrine, it may create a new kind of
"tipping point"-if the idea catches on and becomes contagious, its
effect on society's approach to climate action may be felt even in
states, such as North Carolina, that would have rejected it if
previously given an express opportunity. 224 However, unless such a
tipping point is reached, the public policy concerns, practical
difficulties, and jurisdictional challenges associated with the
Atmospheric Trust will likely limit its viability as a workable solution
to the government's failure to address the climate crisis. Promotion of
such an expansive application of the public trust doctrine in states like
North Carolina may undermine the strength and independence of the
doctrine itself, which could in turn undercut existing heightened
protection of other important natural resources. This could
conceivably lead to degradation of water and coastal resources in the
pockets of states which adopt it, strained relationships between states
with differing obligations, and an ultimate failure to solve the national
atmospheric pollution problem.

to each other for any waste or permanent impairment of the trust assets. See id. However,
this co-tenancy arrangement would only be viable if every state adopted the Atmospheric
Trust, which this Comment has demonstrated is not probable. A sovereign state simply
cannot be liable to another state for failure to meet an obligation it does not have.
223. See Wood I, supra note 13, at 148.
224. If the Atmospheric Trust theory were to be accepted in a critical mass of states, it
may become more realistic to advocate for its adoption in states like North Carolina. But
even then, its potential for success may hinge on how the issue is framed. For example, a
lawsuit in North Carolina would be more likely to succeed if adoption of the expanded
doctrine is cast as a means by which to protect coastal and water resources from the
consequences of climate change. North Carolina courts may be more willing to broaden
the scope of the state's public trust doctrine if it is more closely tied to the state's common
law precedent and constitutional mandate, see supra Part I.C-2, and the state legislature
may be less inclined to override it if the emphasis is on water resources and a critical mass
of neighboring states are moving in that direction.
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CONCLUSION

The Atmospheric Trust proposal is truly an intriguing and
captivating legal theory, especially for those struggling to identify a
silver bullet in the fight to mitigate climate change. But when one digs
deeper and takes a hard and honest look at the practical realities of
the public trust doctrine, its history, its variation, and the obstacles to
its expansion, that silver bullet starts to look a little more gray.
Acknowledging the possibility that the Atmospheric Trust may
ultimately prove unable to address the climate crisis, litigation efforts
promoting its adoption must run in parallel with other potential
avenues which may prove more fruitful, either for particular states or
regions, or for the country-and the world-overall. First, the United
States Environmental Protection Agency must now regulate
greenhouse gas emissions under the Clean Air Act.225 Public
involvement in the rulemaking process may help influence the form
and function of the regulations which will be promulgated to
implement this mandate.22 6 Second, California recently implemented
a cap and trade program under its Global Warming Solutions Act,
which may provide a useful model for the nation. 227 Third,
225. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 528 (2007) (directing the EPA to make a
finding as to whether greenhouse gas emissions "may reasonably be anticipated to
endanger public health or welfare," and if so, to regulate them under the Clean Air Act);
Coal. for Responsible Regulation v. EPA, 684 F.3d 102, 115, 128 (D.C. Cir. 2012),
(upholding the EPA's endangerment finding and its promulgation of the Tailpipe Rule,
regulating greenhouse gas emissions from mobile sources under the Clean Air Act and
stating that "once the Tailpipe Rule set motor-vehicle emission standards for greenhouse
gases, [those gases] became a regulated pollutant under the Act, requiring PSD and Title
V greenhouse permitting."), cert. granted in part sub nom. Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v.
EPA, No. 12-1146, 2013 WL 1155428 (U.S. Oct. 15, 2013).
226. The EPA announced a proposed rule establishing a New Source Performance
Standard (NSPS) for new electric generating units (EGUs) in April 2012. See Standards of
Performance for Greenhouse Gas Emissions for New Stationary Sources: Electric Utility
Generating Units, 77 Fed. Reg. 22,391 (proposed April 13, 2012). However, the EPA
failed to finalize the rule after receiving more than two million public comments. See
Memorandum of June 25, 2013-Power Sector Carbon Pollution Standards, 78 Fed. Reg.
39,535 (July 1, 2013). President Obama directed the EPA to issue a new proposed rule by
September 20, 2013, and to finalize it "in a timely fashion after considering all public
comments, as appropriate." Id. at 39,535. The EPA must also issue a, proposed rule by
June 1, 2015, to regulate existing sources under Section 111(d) of the Clean Air Act. Id. at
39,536; see JAMES E. MCCARTHY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43127, EPA STANDARDS
FOR GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS FROM POWER PLANTS: MANY QUESTIONS, SOME
ANSWERS 4 (2013).

227. See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, §§ 95801-96022 (2012); see also Remarks by the
President in the State of the Union Address (Feb. 12, 2013), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/02/12/remarks-president-state-unionaddress ("I urge this Congress to get together, [to] pursue a bipartisan, market-based
solution to climate change...." (emphasis added)).
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involvement of the United States in the international effort to curb
greenhouse gas emissions may strengthen now that China has
implemented its own cap and trade program for carbon,228 and as a
result of President Obama's pledge to "lead international efforts to
address global climate change" as an integral part of the Presidential
Climate Action Plan announced in June 2013.229
All of these potential avenues for persuading the government to
adequately regulate greenhouse gas emissions have merit and are
certainly worth pursuing. Important lessons can be gleaned from the
practical limitations of the Atmospheric Trust theory, and those
lessons should inform the way in which advocates choose to move
forward. Proponents of any approach must be cognizant of the risks
of pursuing a goal so valiantly, especially when other, more
practicable, solutions might be just over the horizon.
If we have not crossed the tipping point yet, we are rapidly
approaching it. 230 Time is of the essence in the effort to mitigate
climate change, and we cannot allow societal apathy or political
inertia to hold us back from doing something before it is too late. But
at the same time, it may take a more targeted than blanket approach
to accommodate the range of interests involved and the challenges
faced by the various states. Those working in jurisdictions like North
Carolina, where implementation of the Atmospheric Trust would be
an uphill battle at best, must find another way to jumpstart United
States involvement in the global effort to address climate change;
surely it can be done without jeopardizing vital resources already
protected by the public trust. It is time to let go and move on to fight
another day.
CAROLINE CRESS"

228. See China Carbon Debut Defies Emissions Doubters, BLOOMBERG
BUSINESSWEEK (Oct. 12, 2012), http://www.businessweek.com/news/2012-10-11/chinacarbon-debut-defies-emission-doubters-energy-markets#p2.
229. THE PRESIDENT'S CLIMATE ACTION PLAN, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
17-21
(June
2013),
available
at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default
/files/image/president27sclimateactionplan.pdf (discussing bilateral collaborative efforts as
well as increased participation in international negotiations) (original in all caps).
230. See Wood I, supranote 13, at 100.
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